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Fudging Failure: The Economic Analysis
Used to Construct Child Support Guidelines
Ira Mark Ellmant
Federal law requires that all states have guidelines to de-
termine, in most cases, the amount of a child support award.
Federal law also requires states to reexamine their guidelines
every fourth year to ensure that they continue to set appropriate
awards in light of possibly changing economic conditions. These
revisions are typically carried out with the assistance of eco-
nomic consultants. This Article is about the substance of that
revision process as it is conducted in most states, and in particu-
lar the method employed by the economic consultants that assist
in the revision process. Their method assumes a particular con-
ception of how child support awards should be formulated. I ex-
plain below why this conception is most accurately labeled the
"continuity-of-marginal-expenditure" model. Consultants then
engage in a technical exercise through which they implement
this model, ultimately yielding a set of recommended award lev-
els for varying family sizes and parental incomes.
This Article explains why this model simply fails to engage
the basic policy questions that must be addressed in any rational
analysis of child support policy. Moreover, it shows that even if,
adventitiously, the model were correct, its implementation is
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badly flawed, for two separate reasons. First, it relies upon an
economic tool, the equivalence scale, that has been appropriately
criticized in the economic literature as theoretically suspect and
empirically unverifiable. Second, it relies upon compromised data
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. While the problems
with this data may be less important for other applications, in
this case they introduce distortions in the consultants' analysis
that have important policy implications. These conceptual and
implementation flaws in the typical consultant's analysis are
especially troubling because they appear to be entirely invisible
to the policymakers charged with writing child support guide-
lines. This Article, therefore, is not about whether child support
guidelines are too low or too high. It is about how an opaque
technical analysis that policymakers rely upon, but understand
only poorly, prevents them from even considering that question
in any systematic way. Child support guidelines are thus an ex-
ample of a troubling phenomena that may arise in other lawmak-
ing areas as well: the displacement of policy analysis by "expert
consultants" who convert the rulemaking task into a technical
exercise that conceals the policy implications of their methodo-
logical choices from those responsible for choosing the policy.
Part I of this Article identifies and explains the "continuity-
of-marginal-expenditure" principle implicitly assumed by the
economic consultants relied upon in the writing of support guide-
lines, and shows why this principle directs attention away from
the real policy question that those writing support guidelines
should address: what level of child support is most consistent
with the twin goals of protecting child welfare and of treating
both parents fairly in the allocation of the support burden be-
tween them. Part II examines the standard consultant methodol-
ogy more closely. It shows how the equivalence scale tool relied
upon by consultants necessarily leads to guidelines based upon
marginal expenditures, it discusses why this is almost certainly
the wrong foundational principle to use, and it explores why, in
any event, equivalence scales are regarded with suspicion in the
economic literature. Part II also explains the difference between
the two alternative equivalence scales used by consultants who
work on child support guidelines, and why the choice between
them is both consequential and unavoidably arbitrary. Part III
looks at the data one must necessarily rely upon if the dominant
equivalence scale methodology is used: the Consumer Expendi-
ture Survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. It shows why im-
portant defects in that data source, some well-known, pose par-
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ticular problems for this use of it. The most central defect is the
Survey's systematic undercount of income for the lower 40 per-
cent of the population, and of expenditures for the upper 20 per-
cent. These undercounts in the available data combine with the
typical consultant methodology to yield a highly regressive sup-
port schedule that is more an artifact of the bad data than a re-
flection of actual parental behavior.
The Article concludes with some suggestions for how the
current process can be refashioned and improved, including al-
ternative bodies of research that might be relied upon during the
revision process. These suggestions are made with full apprecia-
tion of the methodological barriers that pose challenges to any
effort at reform. Those barriers suggest that while the current
process can be improved, we cannot achieve the kind of precision
in implementing any policy choice that might seem implied by
the nature of support guidelines themselves, which by law are
required to give an exact dollar amount of the appropriate child
support award in each case. Nonetheless, we can do much better
than we do today. Improvement is possible if rulemakers con-
front and make the important policy choices overtly.
I. THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES:
FUNDAMENTALS OF THE CURRENT APPROACH
Since 1989, the federal Department of Health and Human
Services ("HHS") has required all states to have child support
guidelines "based on specific descriptive and numeric criteria"
that lead to the computation of a specific child support award in
each case.' The purpose was to simplify the process through
which the amount of a child support award is determined,
thereby making it easier and less costly for a custodial parent to
obtain a support order. State law must provide that the amount
yielded by application of the required guidelines is presumed to
be the correct amount of the child support award, although the
presumption can be rebutted if the court explains why it is "in-
appropriate or unjust" in the particular case.2 Each state must
1 45 CFR § 302.56(a)(2) (1989).
2 These provisions are contained in 45 CFR § 302.56, which reads in part as follows:
(a) Effective October 13, 1989, as a condition of approval of its State plan, the
State shall establish one set of guidelines by law or by judicial or administrative
action for setting and modifying child support award amounts within the State.
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review its guidelines every four years to ensure that they con-
tinue to provide for an appropriate child support award. 3 But the
federal rules are oblique at best in suggesting the criteria by
which to determine whether an award is "appropriate." The only
hint is contained in 45 C.F.R. § 302.56(h), which specifies that in
the required quadrennial review of the support guidelines, "a
State must consider economic data on the cost of raising chil-
dren."4 This provision is misleading. It appears to assume that
objective data on the cost of raising children exists and ought to
be important, and perhaps even primary, in setting the level of
child support awards. Yet that was not the accepted understand-
ing in 1989 when the federal government adopted these guideline
regulations. In the standard work on the topic then available,
(c) The guidelines... must at a minimum:
(1) Take into consideration all earnings and income of the noncustodial
parent;
(2) Be based on specific descriptive and numeric criteria and result in a
computation of the support obligation; and
(3) Provide for the child(ren)'s health care needs, through health insurance
coverage or other means.
(e) The State must review, and revise, if appropriate, the guidelines established
under paragraph (a) of this section at least once every four years to ensure that
their application results in the determination of appropriate child support
award amounts.
(f) Effective October 13, 1989, the State must provide that there shall be a re-
buttable presumption, in any judicial or administrative proceeding for the
award of child support, that the amount of the award which would result from
the application of the guidelines established under paragraph (a) of this section
is the correct amount of child support to be awarded.
(g) A written finding or specific finding on the record.., that the application of
the guidelines ... would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case shall be
sufficient to rebut the presumption in that case, as determined under criteria
established by the State. Such criteria must take into consideration the best in-
terests of the child. Findings that rebut the guidelines shall state the amount of
support that would have been required under the guidelines and include a justi-
fication of why the order varies from the guidelines.
(h) As part of the review of a State's guidelines required under paragraph (e) of
this section, a State must consider economic data on the cost of raising children
and analyze case data, gathered through sampling or other methods, on the ap-
plication of, and deviations from, the guidelines. The analysis of the data must
be used in the State's review of the guidelines to ensure that deviations from
the guidelines are limited.
3 45 CFR § 302.56(e).
4 45 CFR § 302.56(h).
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Thomas Espenshade explained that "asking about the cost of
raising a child is unsatisfactory" for two reasons: (1) "it invites
answers that focus on some minimum level required for biologi-
cal subsistence," and (2) it "implies a single answer when in fact
a range of answers is possible."5 Indeed, a range of answers is
inevitable once one goes beyond subsistence measures, because
the cost of a child, like the cost of an adult, depends upon the
living standard one means to reference: the cost of living, in
other words, depends upon the standard of living.6 An upper-
class lifestyle costs more than a middle-class lifestyle which costs
more than a lower-class one which costs more than life at the
poverty threshold. Espenshade thus emphasized that he was "es-
timating parental expenditures on children, not the cost of rais-
ing them" and parental expenditures varied with parental in-
come. 7 All three of the reports later commissioned under HHS
auspices echoed this view.8 The prevalent understanding, both
5 Thomas J. Espenshade, Investing in Children: New Estimates of Parental Expendi-
tures 1-2 (Urban Institute 1984).
6 Id at 2.
7 Id at 2, 1-2.
8 The first such report, formally issued by an Advisory Panel assembled by the Na-
tional Center for State Courts, was funded by the federal Office of Child Support En-
forcement, and relied explicitly on Espenshade:
At the higher income levels, there is no absolute standard for the "cost" of rear-
ing a child. Rather, economic studies are able to infer the "cost" of rearing a
child at a given income level only by observing the actual expenditures allocated
to a child in existing households.... For development of child support guide-
lines, Thomas Espenshade's work entitled Investing in Children seems to pro-
vide the most credible economic foundation.
Robert Williams, Development of Guidelines for Child Support Orders: Advisory Panel
Recommendations and Final Report, Office of Child Support Enforcement, US Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Final Report II-ii (1987). The second, by David
Betson, was prepared under a contract with the University of Wisconsin's Institute for
Research on Poverty for a final report to HHS, Alternative Estimates of the Cost of Chil-
dren from the 1980-86 Consumer Expenditure Survey, Institute for Research on Poverty
Special Report No 51 (1990) (final report cited in note 31). While the text as well as the
title of Betson's report often refers to the "costs" of children, the only thing he even pur-
ports to measure is parental expenditures on them-essentially equating costs and ex-
penditures. Indeed, the report describes itself as a response to a provision in § 128 of the
Family Support Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-485, that required HHS to "detail the patterns
of expenditures on children in two-parent families and single-parent families." Id at 1
(emphasis added). The third, LewinIICF, Estimates of Expenditures on Children and
Child Support Guidelines (1990), was a companion to the Betson report that fulfilled the
remaining Congressional reporting requirements. It reviews the Betson study as well as
other sources of information on how much parents in fact spend on their children, review-
ing both the methodologies and the implications of the data for child support. The Lewin
report explicitly recognizes that the purely empirical question of how much parents in
fact spend on their children is different from the question necessarily addressed by child
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then and now, is that while the regulation refers to costs, the
relevant data really concern expenditures, and because parental
expenditures on children vary with parental income, so does the
"cost" of children, and thus also the level of the appropriate child
support award. The authors of the first two reports have fre-
quently been relied upon as consultants by states revising their
child support guidelines.9 They provide estimate of parental ex-
penditures on children, and help devise support guidelines based
upon these estimates.
So the C.F.R.'s reference to the cost of raising children is
widely understood as a term of art that in fact refers to parental
expenditures on children.10 The point is not just technical. Be-
cause expenditures on children vary with parental income, this
conception of child support endorses the idea that the noncusto-
dial parent should share his income with his child. Support obli-
gations should, in other words, increase with the noncustodial
parent's income.
support guidelines, which is how much separated parents should spend on their children.
Id at 1-5.
9 Some of this history is recounted in Jane Venohr and Robert Williams, The Imple-
mentation and Periodic Review of State Child Support Guidelines, 33 Fam L Q 7, 7-9
(1999). Williams founded and remains the head of Policy Studies, Inc. ("PSI"), a private
company which appears to be pervasive in providing states with consulting services in
connection with their regular guideline reviews. According to the company's web site,
they have conducted studies to determine the "Economic Basis for Updated Child Support
Schedule" for "numerous states."
Over the past 10 years, we have reviewed states' child support guidelines based
on the most recent economic data on the costs of child rearing, developed new
child support obligation schedules, and helped states examine the impact of ad-
justments to their support schedules for such factors as low income, second
families, visitation, shared custody, medical and educational costs, etc.
Policy Studies Inc., Economic Basis for Updated Child Support Schedule (numerous
states), Various Years, available online at <http://www.policy-
studies.com/company/publications/default.asp> (visited July, 9, 2004). Jane Venohr re-
ports that PSI prepared guideline recommendations for consideration by the relevant
state agencies in twelve states during 2000-03, and provided child support related con-
sulting services to others. Telephone conversation with Jane Venohr (Dec 23, 2003). Bet-
son's estimates of child support expenditures are routinely relied upon by PSI in their
consulting work. In 2001 he updated his 1990 report with more recent data from the
Consumer Expenditure Survey. See Jane Venohr and Tracy Griffith, Policy Studies, Inc.,
Economic Basis for Updated Child Support Schedule, State of Arizona 3 (Feb 6, 2003).
Chapter Five of California's Review of Statewide Uniform Child Support Guideline, 2001,
available online at <http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/programs/description/
1058study200l.htm>, was prepared with PSI's assistance. It contains no attribution to
Betson, but is in fact his 2001 report. Telephone conversation with Jane Venohr (Dec 23,
2003).
10 Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at 2 (cited in note 9).
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But as the states typically implement guidelines, the cost of
children still plays a role. Minimum subsistence costs affect
guideline amounts at the low end of the income range, where
support guidelines may require obligors to pay a higher percent-
age of their income in order to ensure that the child does not fall
below that minimum threshold, at least so long as the support
order would not force the obligor himself below that level." At
very high incomes, a few states cap award levels, and others give
judges increased discretion to set the award below the amount
that would result from simply extrapolating proportionately from
guideline awards applicable at lower incomes. 12 These limits on
high-end awards arise from the belief that at the point at which
the guidelines top out, all reasonable costs of the child have been
met, making further increases in the support level unnecessary.
Ideas about the objective cost of children thus do sometimes set
boundaries for support awards at both income extremes. But be-
tween these bookends, the principle of income sharing prevails
across an income range that includes the great majority of par-
ents. For these households, then, the central question presented
to a committee drafting support guidelines is: exactly how much
income should the noncustodial parent be required to share with
the custodial household?
That question could be answered in many different ways.
The existing focus on parental child expenditures effectively
adopts, as the norm by which guidelines are constructed, the
amount that parents in intact families spend on their children.
This norm can be called the continuity of expenditure rule, and
can best be formulated in percentage, rather than dollar, terms:
parents ought to contribute the same percentage of their income
to child support after a divorce that they would have contributed
11 For such a provision, see American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution § 3.053A (2002). The Melson Formula, named after the Delaware judge who
first devised it, also incorporates this idea. See the description of it in Ira Ellman, Paul
Kurtz, and Elizabeth Scott, Family Law: Cases, Text, Problems 533-34 (Lexis Law 3d ed,
1998). On the other side, states often have special provisions excusing low-income obli-
gors from what might otherwise be the full amount of their obligation, but these provi-
sions also often specify minimum support payments that apply even if they constitute a
higher percentage of the obligor's income. See the compilation of low-income support
provisions gathered by the staff of the National Conference of State Legislatures, avail-
able online at <http://www.ncsl.org/programscyf/incomelow.htm> (visited July 9, 2004).
12 For examples of such provisions, see the discussion in Ellman, Kurtz and Scott,
Family Law at 554-57 (cited in note 11), and the compilation gathered by the staff of the
National Conference of State Legislatures, available online at
<httpJ/www.ncsl.orgprogram/cyf/incomehi.htm> (visited July 9, 2004).
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if their relationship had not dissolved.13 Under this approach,
one calculates the average amount spent on children by parents
in an intact family, at any given income level. Divorced parents
with the same aggregate income are then required to pay the
same percentage of that income in child support. Each parent's
respective share of the obligation is proportional to that parent's
share of the total parental income. The support order requires
the noncustodial parent to pay an amount equal to that parent's
share; the rule assumes the custodial parent necessarily contrib-
utes her share in the course of maintaining the custodial house-
hold. Because of both constitutional and policy imperatives re-
quiring that marital and nonmarital children be treated equally,
the same guideline number is applied to support awards for chil-
dren whose parents were never married and never lived with one
another in an intact family relationship. 14
As a principle of fairness, and of social policy, the continuity-
of-expenditure norm is plausible. What people in intact families
spend on their children can be seen as a convenient and reason-
able benchmark of society's view as to the fair and appropriate
amount to require divorced parents to spend on their children.
Yet, it is not the inevitable benchmark. For one thing, the usual
analysis only attempts to determine the average expenditure
level on children in families at given income levels, but there is
reason to think that expenditures of actual families vary quite
13 Of course, we cannot know what any particular set of parents in particular would
have spent on their children had their marriage remained intact, and so this sentence is
not literally true even though it expresses the underlying idea upon which guidelines are
based. That idea is implemented, however, by looking at the average expenditures by
parents in intact families who have the same combined parental income as do the divorc-
ing parents. The average expenditure of these parents becomes the benchmark upon
which the guidelines rely. One can think of this benchmark as our best prediction, on
average, of what the particular parents would have spent on their children if they had not
divorced. As set out here, the description fits what are called "income shares" states more
closely than "percentage of obligor income" states, but there is in fact no difference in
principle between them. See text accompanying notes 25-32.
14 The basic constitutional cases are Gomez v Perez, 409 US 535 (1979) (finding that
Texas violated the Equal Protection Clause when it allowed marital but not nonmarital
children to enforce a right of support), and Clark v Jeter, 486 US 456 (1988) (holding
Pennsylvania violated the Equal Protection Clause in barring support actions for non-
marital children brought more than six years after their birth, where later actions for
marital children were not similarly time barred). Federal law then required states to
allow support claims for nonmarital children at any time before the child's eighteenth
birthday. See Public Health and Welfare, 42 USC § 666(a)(5) (1999). While these cases do
not necessarily require that the amount of support for marital and nonmarital children be
identical, this is the interpretation put on them by some courts and the approach gener-
ally taken by the states. See the discussion at Ellman, Kurtz, and Scott, Family Law at
1061-62 (cited in note 11).
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considerably around that mean.15 In that case, one could move
some distance above or below the mean figure and still claim
nearly as substantial an endorsement from the expenditure
data-which means that policy considerations arising from other
sources can reasonably be given proportionately more weight.
More fundamentally, parents who live together in an intact fam-
ily are in a different situation than divorced parents living in
separate households, both economically and with respect to their
relationship with their children. Nor are divorced parents all
similarly situated with one another, much less with parents in
intact families: some divorced parents remarry, some do not;
some benefit economically from remarriage, for others remar-
riage yields additional financial obligations. Perhaps these and
other differences should influence our judgment of the fair level
of child support, or perhaps they should not. The matter is not
free from doubt. While a continuity-of-expenditure principle nec-
essarily answers these questions (because it does not count such
differences), it does so by ignoring them rather than by confront-
ing and resolving them.
If one considered how much income the noncustodial parent
should share with the custodial household, without thinking in
continuity-of-expenditure terms, one might take a very different
approach. The first matter to consider is why we require support.
Our reason might be to serve the child's interests, or to ensure
that the support burden is allocated fairly as between the par-
ents, or to achieve a balanced blend of the two. If one believes the
child's interests are paramount, for example, one might believe
the support level should be set high enough to ensure that the
child, who is presumably the innocent victim of the marital fail-
ure, suffers no financial harm at all from the divorce, even if that
principle requires an award which gives the child a higher post-
divorce living standard than the support obligor enjoys. Yet an
exclusive focus on the child might also lead one to conclude that
a custodial parent with sufficient resources to provide the child
with a comfortable environment should receive no compelled
support from the other parent, because the child welfare value of
15 See Laurie J. Bassi and Burt S. Barnow, Expenditures on Children and Child
Support Guidelines, 12 J Pol Anal and Manage 478, 486 (1993). They estimate that if the
mean expenditure on two children in a two-parent household is 27 percent of all expendi-
tures, one has to employ a range of 15 to 36 percent to capture 80 percent of those fami-
lies-with the remaining 20 percent evenly divided between those below 15 and those
above 36. They derive these figures from Chapter 7 of Edward Lazear and Robert Mi-
chael, Allocation of Income Within the Household (Chicago 1988).
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any award could not be shown. In other words, if child welfare
concerns were all we cared about, we would presumably require
the highest support levels from which the child would derive
benefit, but no higher-and so in writing the guidelines we would
mainly want to know all we could about the benefits that flow to
children from various levels of support payments.16
16 One might assume that from the child's perspective, the higher the support
amount the better, but that is probably not right. Obviously, the child may also experi-
ence detrimental effects from a support award that impoverished the obligor parent. But
even beyond that, it is not necessarily clear that more money always yields more benefit.
Rather, it seems likely that the relationship between the dollar amount of support and
the amount of benefit conferred on children is not linear-that at least above some sup-
port level, marginal dollars will purchase declining amounts of child welfare. This obser-
vation might be important if one wished to set the child support award by balancing the
additional welfare purchased against the detriment imposed on the obligor from a higher
support order. Indeed, it is plausible that there is an amount above which additional
money adds little or nothing to child welfare, but it is very unclear at what point that
amount is reached. Some writers suggest that money does not play a large role in chil-
dren's outcomes. See, for example, Susan Mayer, What Money Can't Buy: Family Income
and Children's Life Chances (Harvard 1997). On the other hand, some sociologists find
some evidence that financial hardship in the custodial family translates into real welfare
losses for the child, and even that child support dollars are better than other dollars. S.S.
McLanahan, et al, Child Support Enforcement and Child Well-Being: Greater Security or
Greater Conflict?, in I. Garfinkel, S.S. McLananhan, and P.K. Robins, eds, Child Support
and Child Well-Being 1 (Urban Institute 1994). But that conclusion may be contested.
One careful review of the literature concludes that the assumption that
children's well-being is linked to the amount of child support received, has re-
ceived surprisingly little test or support .... Only McLanahan et al (1994) has
subjected the assumption to test, and the results are mixed. While the associa-
tion initially appears positive, what cannot be ruled out is the issue that fami-
lies in which child support is well-paid are different from those in which it isn't
in many respects, and that it is these other factors rather than child support per
se that truly account for any differences in children's well-being. Some of these
factors, such as level of education and/or income of each of the parents have
been measured and statistically controlled for in the past empirical investiga-
tions. However, the factors that are known (according to the most definitive
standard, Amato & Keith's 1991 meta-analysis) to best account for children's
adjustment overall, far better than children's economic levels, such as level of
conflict between the parents, and degree of the co-parental relationship, are
empirically very intertwined with child support received, yet have not been held
constant in the above findings. Thus it remains highly plausible that those cou-
ples who enjoy what Ahrons call "a good divorce," a rather civil, amicable and
cooperative post-divorce relationship, one which features a mutually supportive
co-parental relationship, have far better adjusted children, and more substan-
tial and compliant child support is paid, yet no direct causal relationship ap-
plies between the two. What remains to be shown by conclusive evidence, then,
is that child support payments make a contribution to children's well-being
even in the absence of a civil relationship between parents.
S.L. Braver, The Gender Gap in Standard of Living After Divorce: Vanishingly Small?, 33
Fam L Q 111 (1999). Braver also suggests, however, that there is some support in the
literature for the inference that child support payments which are voluntary or otherwise
uncoerced convey more concern and love than mandated or ordered child support, and
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In contrast, if fairness between the parents is the paramount
purpose of support, one would require support from the noncus-
todial parent even if it added little or no child benefit to the com-
fortable environment that a financially secure custodial parent
might alone be able to provide, because one would still want the
noncustodial parent to contribute his fair share, thus freeing
some of the custodial parent's resources for non-child expendi-
tures. We might also decline to make some awards that were ap-
propriate on child welfare grounds because they would be re-
garded as unfairly burdensome to the obligor.
One can thus see that child welfare and fair treatment of the
child's parents can yield conflicting outcomes. A rational child
support system must reflect an appropriate compromise between
them. While the child's interests must be a central concern in
thinking about child support orders, no child support law has
ever made them the exclusive concern. For example, there is no
doubt that the law's concern with treating the obligor fairly helps
explain the upper limits on the size of any support order that
might be entered against him, even though one can also argue
that the child's interests would be compromised by a support or-
der impoverishing the obligor. No one thinks it would be fair to
give the child every dollar the obligor has, even if the child would
benefit from the money, because we are also concerned with the
obligor's own needs. Nor can we explain the law's insistence that
the obligor pay support to a custodial household with ample re-
sources entirely in child welfare terms. It rather seems clear that
the explanation for requiring support in such cases includes, in
important measure, our belief that it would be unfair to leave
even the financially comfortable custodial parent obliged to
shoulder the entire support burden. That is why the law requires
support from the noncustodial parent even when the custodial
parent is able, and would, if necessary, be willing to pay for any
expenditure required to ensure the child's welfare.
In short, while we care about child welfare, we also care
about allocating the support burden fairly as between the par-
ents, and that secondary concern with treating the parents fairly
can, depending upon the facts, either enlarge or reduce the sup-
port order that we would otherwise impose if child welfare were
our exclusive concern. Any set of child support guidelines thus
thereby confer important psychic benefits on the child. S.L. Braver, et al, Promoting bet-
ter fathering among divorced nonresident fathers, in W.M. Pinsof and J. Lebow, eds, Fam-
ily Psychology: The Art of the Science (Oxford forthcoming).
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necessarily states some position with respect to the proper trade-
off between these competing concerns of child welfare and fair
treatment of each parent, whether or not those who write the
guidelines approach their task with such tradeoffs in mind.17
Does the continuity-of-expenditure rule express the appro-
priate compromise of parental and child welfare interests? The
answer to that question is not immediately obvious. What is
more important, the question is not raised by the economic con-
sultants upon whom guideline writers rely, and thus not asked
by the guideline writers themselves-typically, committees re-
porting to either a legislative or judicial body.' 8 The guideline
writing process may of course engage the attention of interest
groups representing custodial or noncustodial parents, and these
groups may battle over the impact of any proposed guidelines on
their respective constituencies. But the standard economic
analysis does not expressly recognize the inevitable trade-off be-
tween these competing interests, and it therefore lends no assis-
tance to the policymaking body ultimately responsible for those
tradeoffs. Indeed, it seems that participants in the process-
members of the guideline writing committee-assume that the
setting of support guidelines is an exercise in economic analysis
requiring primarily technical economic expertise, rather than an
exercise in policymaking requiring interest balancing. Even
those inclined to challenge the numbers offered by the economic
analysis may therefore feel constrained to frame their challenge
as a question about whether the recommendations accurately
implement the continuity-of-expenditure principle, rather than
questioning whether that principle should be the ultimate
benchmark against which support guidelines are measured. 19
17 For an early and able statement of this point, see David Betson, et al, Trade-Offs
Implicit in Child-Support Guidelines, 11 J Pol Anal & Manage 2, 10 (1992).
18 A compilation compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures ("NCSL")
finds that support guidelines are adopted by legislative action in twenty-five states, by
judicial action in eighteen states, and by specially created agencies or commissions in the
remainder. See National Conference of State Legislatures, available online at
<http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/branch.htm> (visited July 9, 2004). Such tabulations
necessarily oversimplify. For example, for this purpose California is counted among the
twenty-five states that adopt their guidelines legislatively, but the legislation is based
upon recommendations of a committee appointed by the California Judicial Council. An
examination of the NCSL compilation shows that reliance on such specially appointed
committees is common, even when the ultimate adopting authority is the legislature or
the state's highest court. Consultants typically work with these committees rather than
with the ultimate adopting authority.
19 This certainly was my experience as a member of the Arizona guideline workgroup.
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That is, guideline committees often view the economic
analysis as implementing a predetermined principle of child
support, so that the real question is the purely technical one of
assuring that the guidelines correctly implement that principle.
How could they think the principle is predetermined? Some may
believe, erroneously, that federal law not only requires reexami-
nation of their guidelines every four years, but also requires that
their guidelines implement the continuity-of-expenditure princi-
ple. Others may not appreciate that there is a policy choice to be
made at all, because they do not understand that the continuity-
of-expenditure principle is different from other possible princi-
ples that their guidelines might implement.
Consider, for example, three current and official New York
publications that purport to explain New York's guidelines. The
official web page of the New York City Administrator of Children
Services, Office of Child Support Enforcement, explains that the
goal of New York's guidelines "is to give children the same stan-
dard of living they would have if their parents were together."20
A pamphlet issued by the New York State Division of Child Sup-
port Enforcement, entitled "What Non-Custodial Parents Need to
Know About Child Support" explains: "The guideline was put in
the law to make sure that people pay an amount for support that
is actually close to what it costs to care for a child."21 The June
2001 New York State Child Support Standards Act Quadrennial
Evaluation further explains: "The guidelines, as written, produce
awards roughly in line with the accepted standard of requiring
the noncustodial parent to pay in support what he or she would
have contributed to the children in an intact family."22 These
20 New York State Division of Child Enforcement, available online at
<http'jhome.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/support/support-ocsecalc.html> (visited Feb 2, 2004).
For a similar characterization, see the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services,
Office of Child Support, Program Guide 6 (Aug 2003), available online at
<http//jfs.ohio.gov/ocs/programguide2.pdf> (visited July 13, 2004) ("Ohio uses an income
shares model which calculates a child support order by the standard of living that a child
would experience if the parents were in the same household.").
21 New York State Division of Child Enforcement, Pub 4721, What Noncustodial
Parents Need to Know About Child Support, available online at <https:llnewyorkchildsup-
port.comlpublications.html#broc> (visited July 8, 2004). This understanding of the guide-
lines' purpose seems common. A judge who has served several times in succession on the
Arizona guideline committee explained to the author, when asked this question, that the
guidelines were based on the cost of children and ensured that both parents paid their
full share of those costs.
22 New York State Division of Child Enforcement, Child Support Standards Act
Quadrennial Evaluation (June 2001), available online at
<httpsJ/newyorkchildsupport.com/publications.html#quad > (visited July 13, 2004).
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three contemporary descriptions of the same state guidelines ac-
tually express three entirely different principles which, if imple-
mented, would yield three very different sets of guidelines, yet it
appears that at least some child support officials of this very
large and sophisticated state mistakenly believe these three
statements are consistent with one another. Of the three, only
the last comes close to expressing the continuity-of-expenditure
principle upon which New York's guidelines are actually based,
although it can also be read to mean something quite different. 23
The first two statements, however, are completely wrong because
they state principles that neither New York nor any other state
implements or even seeks to implement in its support guide-
lines.24
States have in practice implemented the continuity-of-
expenditure rule in one of two forms. The larger group have
adopted what is called "income shares"; a substantial minority
use the simpler "percentage of obligor income" ("POO") ap-
proach.25 Income shares states use guidelines that establish a
23 The statement appears to express the continuity of expenditure principle. But as
explained in text accompanying and following note 33, that principle, as implemented by
nearly all state guidelines, in fact requires continuity of marginal expenditures only, not
of all family expenditures which confer benefits on children. It seems likely that this
subtle but important distinction would be missed by most readers.
24 The first statement is wrong because it implies the guidelines will provide the
child with the marital living standard (the living standard the child would enjoy "if the
parents were together"). It is virtually impossible in most cases to achieve this result, as
is obvious, once one thinks about it. If the two parents have the same income as they did
during marriage, the additional costs necessarily arising from the division of one house-
hold into two ensures that the custodial household cannot maintain the marital living
standard without driving the noncustodial parent well below that. No child support
guideline in the country, and certainly not New York's, actually adopts this principle. The
second formulation is of course completely off because it erroneously describes the guide-
line as requiring payment of the amount that a child "costs." The third formulation-that
the "noncustodial parent pay in support what he or she would have contributed to the
children in an intact family"-may mistakenly be read by some as specifying a support
order that would yield the marital-living-standard result described in the first. That
reading would be wrong because only the marginal amount the obligor contributed. That
is, the normal American support guideline is designed to require that the noncustodial
parent contribute an amount equal only to his likely marginal expenditures on the child
if the family were intact, and that amount will not provide the custodial household with
the marital living standard, except adventitiously in a small minority of cases (as ex-
plained in text accompanying notes 34-35). If the third statement is meant to reference a
contribution larger than or different from the marginal expenditure, than it is not in fact
an accurate statement of the intent of the New York guideline.
25 One recent compilation found that thirty-three states employed income shares, and
thirteen used POOL. Massachusetts and the District of Columbia were classified as "hy-
brid" in this compilation; their guidelines in fact reflect an analysis quite similar to that
recommended by the American Law Institute (see the discussion at text accompanying
notes 38-44). This survey found three states employing what has been called the "Melson"
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combined parental child support obligation for any given number
of children and the combined parental income.26 The support ob-
ligor is then expected to pay his share of this combined parental
obligation; his share is proportional to his share of the combined
parental income.27 POOI states, by contrast, simply apply a per-
centage directly to the obligor income, without considering the
obligee's. 28 If the percentage of the combined income that parents
in intact families spend on their children does not vary with the
level of their income, then these two systems will yield the same
dollar award. 29 If the percentage of parental income spent on
children does vary with income, then the income shares and
POOI systems will not produce the same result. Many of the in-
come shares guidelines in use today reflect the belief that as par-
ents' incomes rise, they spend a lower percentage of their in-
comes on their children.30 Whether this is true is not clear; there
is good reason to think that parental expenditures on children
formula; that approach is much like POOI except for its treatment of low-income families.
Venohr and Williams, 33 Fam L Q at 19 (cited in note 9).
26 See Betson, et al, 11 J Pol Anal & Manage at 13-14 (cited in note 17).
27 Id.
28 See Venohr and Williams, 33 Fam L Q at 10-12 (cited in note 9).
29 This point has been made before. See Betson, et al, 11 J Pol Anal & Manage at 10
(cited in note 17), citing a 1989 working paper by Garfinkel and Melli. It can be demon-
strated through this proof:
Assume Dad is support obligor. Let
D = Dad's Income
M = Mom's Income,
D% = Dad's percent of combined income=D/(D+M).
CE% = the constant percent of aggregate parental income (D+M) that par-
ents spend on their children, throughout the entire income range.
Then
a) In POOL: Dad pays CE% of D, i.e., (CE%)(D)
b) In Income Shares:
(1) Total Child Support Obligation is (CE%)(D+M)
(2) Dad's Share is D%.
(3) Dad pays (D%)(CE%)(D+M)
But since D% = D/(D+M), we can substitute in (3)
(4) (D/(D+M))(CE%)(D+M)=(D)(CE%), the identical value as in POOL.
30 See, for example, Venhor and Griffith, Economic Basis at 11-12 (cited in note 9).
New York, which does not use Policy Studies Inc., employs a constant percentage of pa-
rental income across the income range covered by its guidelines.
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may in fact be a roughly constant percentage of total expendi-
tures over an income range that is wide enough to include the
great majority of parents subject to support awards.31
In any event, it can be seen that both income shares and
POOI systems share the premise that child support awards
ought to be based upon an estimate of what parents in intact
families spend on their children (the continuity-of-expenditure
principle), even if there is disagreement as to whether upper-
income parents spend the same percentage of income on their
children as lower income-parents. Determining what parents in
intact families in fact spend on their children thus becomes the
fundamental inquiry every time a POOI or incomes-shares state
(which is nearly every state) reviews its guidelines. As consid-
ered more fully below, this task presents both conceptual and
practical difficulties: many household expenditures go to house-
hold public goods, such as heat, for which there is no unique cor-
rect allocation principle, and for most household private goods,
such as food, data is available only for household consumption in
total, not for consumption by individual household members.32 To
solve this difficulty, the economic consultants use a tool called
the equivalence scale. The equivalence scale is supposed to per-
mit the consultant to determine how much more a childless cou-
ple would have to spend to maintain the equivalent living stan-
dard when children are added to their household.33 The consult-
ant treats this additional expenditure as the dollar amount that
a family at that income level spends on children. I will examine
31 The 1990 Betson study commissioned by HHS, widely relied upon in nearly all
later child support expenditure studies done for support guidelines, concluded that "the
cost of children expressed as a percentage of total expenditures is almost constant across
all levels of total expenditures." David Betson, Alternative Estimates of the Cost of Chil-
dren from the 1980-86 Consumer Expenditure Survey, Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation, US Department of Health and Human Services, Final Report
50 (1990). Betson looked only at families with total expenditures up to $75,000, which is
approximately $112,000 in current dollars. Whether child expenditures are a constant
percentage of income depends largely on whether expenditures are a constant percentage
of income. There is clearly some level of family income above which consumption declines
as a percentage of income. The question, in writing guidelines that set support awards by
income, is the point at which that decline begins-only at the upper reaches of the income
distribution, or throughout a large part of the income distribution range?
32 See Lewin/ICF, Estimates of Expenditures at 2-11 (cited in note 8).
33 See id. PSI does not itself perform this equivalence scale analysis. Rather, it relies
on Professor Betson, who provides it with figures on child expenditures as a percentage of
total household expenditures, and consumption as a percentage of net income. In the
Arizona report, for example, Betson provided all the information in Table 1-3, following
page 12 of Appendix 1; PSI's analysis is based upon these figures. Telephone conversation
with Jane Venohr (Dec 23, 2003).
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this method more fully below. At this point, however, the impor-
tant point is that the equivalence scale method tells one the
marginal expenditure on children only. For that reason the fun-
damental rule underlying most modern support guidelines is
more accurately called the "continuity-of-marginal expenditure"
principle.
A simplified example explains that point. Assume that a
childless couple lives in a one-bedroom apartment that rents for
$1000 per month. They now have a child, and to maintain the
equivalent housing standard, they could rent a two-bedroom
apartment in the same complex for $1300 per month. The logic
that underlies the equivalence table methodology would conclude
that the housing expenditure on the child is $300 per month. If
they have two cars when they are childless, and still only two
cars after they have a child, there may be no marginal transpor-
tation expenditures on children (unless perhaps more miles are
driven). The equivalence table method does not actually proceed
item by item in this manner, but globally, but these examples
communicate its fundamental logic. Yet any household has many
joint consumption items; all its members benefit from the living
room, the kitchen, the heating system, and the cars. Families
make some expenditures (toys, children's clothing) that are solely
for the child. But the child's welfare depends at least as much
upon sharing in the benefits that flow to all family members
from the family's expenditures on joint consumption items. Yet
the equivalence table method systematically excludes them, in
their entirety, from the accounting of child expenditures. It as-
sumes, for example, that the noncustodial parent should share in
the cost of the extra bedroom, but not in these other housing ex-
penditures.
The economic consultants adopt this marginal expenditure
approach without any explicit consideration of how it balances
the various parties' competing interests. Perhaps adventitiously,
however, if the parents are equal earners, this approach yields a
plausible compromise of the parties' interests. In such cases, it
requires noncustodial parents to pay the custodial parent one-
half of the marginal expenditures that the average intact family
with the same income would have spent on its children (since the
noncustodial parent earns one-half the total parental income).
This transfer will probably leave these equal-earning parents
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with identical living standards in their respective households. 34
If one believes that the child's plausible financial claims are fully
satisfied if the support award gives him a living standard equal
to that of both his parents, this award leaves the child's claims
uncompromised. Yet it achieves this result without asking the
noncustodial parent to pay more than he would have spent on
account of the child if the family were intact.35 Thus when the
parents are equal earners, an award based upon marginal child
expenditures seems to satisfy fully the most expansive plausible
claim that either side could make, and thus appears beyond ob-
jection.
But in the great majority of cases the parents do not have
equal incomes, and then the marginal expenditure model yields a
34 This assertion is roughly correct if Betson's classic estimates of the marginal cost
of children for couples and one-parent families is correct. His "best guess of the total cost
of raising children, expressed in percentage of total household expenditures as 25 percent,
35 percent, and 40 percent for one, two, and three children in a two-parent household and
40 percent, 55 percent, and 60 percent for one, two, and three children in a one-parent
household." Betson, Alternative Estimates at 57 (cited in note 31). Assume that we have
equal earning parents, each earning $10,000, and Mom will be the custodial parent. We
transfer 25 percent or $2,500 from Dad to Mom under a standard marginal expenditure
guideline. Mom thus has, post-transfer, $12,500, and Dad has $7,500. Under Betson's
estimate, Mom's marginal expenditures on the child will be 40 percent of her post-
transfer income of $12,500, or $5,000. Her household thus has the same living standard
as a single childless person spending $12,500 less $5,000, or $7,500, exactly what Dad
has, post-transfer. More generally, if the marginal expenditure on children in a one par-
ent household is C, then the child support transfer (T) that you need to give the equal
earning parents equal living standard will always be C/(2-C)(I), where I is the income of
either of the equal earning parents before any transfer. For two and three children
households, then, Betson's estimate of C (.55 and .60) require child support transfers of
38 percent and 43 percent-a bit more than a marginal expenditure formula based on his
two-parent households would yield.
35 One might argue that the noncustodial parent's obligation should fall below the
amount he would have spent on the child were the parents living together because his
responsibility for the child is reduced by the custodial arrangement. The claim would be
that it necessarily impairs his relationship with the child, thus depriving him of a portion
of the primary benefit of parenthood. There are some obvious responses to this argument.
One might contest its factual premise, in the belief that the noncustodial parent who
wishes to maintain a close relationship with his child can do so. And one might argue that
the child's interest in receiving needed support trumps the obligor's complaint about
impairment in the relationship, especially as the child is presumably blameless for the
marital breakup and thus also for any impairment of the obligor-child relationship that
results. There are cases, however, in which the decree imposes a custodial arrangement
on an objecting obligor that leaves him no plausible way to avoid impairment of his rela-
tionship with the child (as where the custodial parent is allowed to move with the child to
a distant location). And there are cases in which the child's welfare does not appear to
depend in any important way on the receipt of the full amount of child support. Where
both these factors are present, the obligor's claim for reduced support is more plausible.
See Ira Mark Ellman, Should Visitation Denial Affect The Obligation to Pay Support?, in
William Comanor, ed, The Law and Economics of Child Support Payments - (forthcom-
ing 2004).
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result that is harder to defend.36 It allocates the custodial house-
hold no funds from which to pay joint consumption items (for ex-
ample, the car, the heat, the portion of the rent covering every-
thing other than the child's room). As the custodial parent's in-
come declines relative to the noncustodial parent's income, the
custodial parent has fewer resources with which to pay for these
items. At the limiting case, the custodial parent with no income
other than child support would have no resources with which to
buy these items.37 For this reason, the American Law Institute
("ALI") rejected the simple marginal expenditure model, conclud-
ing that it often failed to balance properly the relevant parties'
competing claims. 38 While the ALI's analysis notes the interests
of the parents, the child, and the state, the core of its analysis
lies in reconciling the noncustodial parent's claim, that the law
should require him to contribute no more to the child's support
than he would have contributed if the family had remained in-
tact, with the child's claim to suffer no more financially from the
divorce than does any other member of the family.39 To fully sat-
isfy the child's claim would require equal living standards for the
custodial and noncustodial households. But from the obligor's
perspective, payments based upon an equal living standards
principle would necessarily require him to pay enough to bring
36 1 say "seems" because there are enough questions about the implementation of the
standard economic analysis to make the actual impact of the guidelines much more diffi-
cult to characterize. Many of the apparent implementation flaws tend to reduce the sup-
port award below actual marginal costs, as explained later in this paper. On the other
hand, it has been argued that the usual comparison of living standards between custodial
and noncustodial households does not consider the potentially significant impact of the
progressive income tax in improving the relative position of the lower income custodial
household, and may not give sufficient consideration to the child care costs incurred by
the noncustodial parent who regularly visits with his children. Sanford Braver and Davis
Stockberger, Child support guidelines and the equalization of living standards, in William
Comanor, ed, The Law and Economics of Child Support Payments - (forthcoming 2004).
I do not purport in this paper to sort out the net impact of these various problems, be-
cause part of my message is that the available economic analysis may not be able to do
that.
37 This is not a fanciful example. The custodial mother of young children may have no
market income, or so little market income, net of childcare, that the point of the example
is largely unchanged. This might seem a case in which an alimony award, in addition to
child support, is more likely. But mothers who were never married to the father usually
have no legal basis upon which to claim alimony, and the support guidelines apply
equally to them. Such mothers are about one-third of all potential child support obligees.
See Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce, Current Population Reports
P60-225, Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2001 (Oct 2003),
available online at <http'J/www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-225.pdf> (visited July 9,
2003), which indicates that 31.2 percent of custodial mothers have never been married.
38 See ALI, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, § 3.05A and comments.
39 Id.
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all members of the custodial household to this level, not only the
children to whom he has a duty. The fact that this reality is un-
avoidable does not make it unobjectionable, yet it also does not
fully answer the child's claim to suffer no more than either of his
parents from the family breakup.
The ALI's compromise of these competing claims is ex-
pressed in § 3.04 of the Family Dissolution Principles, which di-
rects that guidelines be constructed so that the child enjoys "a
standard of living not grossly inferior to that of either parent."40
The obligor's interest is recognized in that the child's claim to
equal treatment is not fully met, but the child's interest is also
recognized in that the obligor must pay enough to ensure that
the child's living standard-and unavoidably, the custodial par-
ent's as well-is not "grossly inferior" to the obligor's.41 The ALI
would implement this principle by requiring that the guidelines
provide a sliding supplement to the marginal expenditure sup-
port calculation.42 The supplement is zero when the parents are
equal earners, or when the custodial parent earns more than the
noncustodial parent.43 It is triggered when the noncustodial par-
ent earns more than the custodial parent, and gradually in-
creases with the size of that earnings gap, calibrated to meet the
"not grossly inferior" standard." Thus the ALI, like the continu-
ity-of-marginal-expenditure rule, rejects the equal living stan-
dards principle; the difference is that the ALI acknowledges the
likelihood of a living standards gap and manages it explicitly.
There is no inherent reason why a continuity-of-expenditure
rule need be a continuity of marginal expenditure, as the eco-
nomic consultants who implement the expenditure approach ap-
parently assume.45 Marginal cost analysis is central to economic
theory, of course. A factory owner deciding upon whether to
enlarge his output would rationally consider only the marginal
cost of the additional output, not the average cost; so long as he
40 ALI, Principles of Law and Family Dissolution, § 3.04.
41 Id.
42 Id at § 3.05.
43 Id.
44 ALI, Principles of Law and Family Dissolution, § 3.05.
45 For example, Policy Studies, Inc. rejects the Department of Agriculture's approach
to estimating the costs of children largely on the ground that it is not limited to marginal
costs: "Child support is commonly understood to provide for the additional costs of chil-
dren. It seems very unlikely that the costs of children would proportionately equal the
adult's initial costs." Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at 12 (cited in note 9). It is
"commonly understood" because that is the approach always taken by PSI itself as well as
by the initial reports commissioned by HHS. See note &
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can sell the additional output for more than its marginal cost, he
is better off. But someone considering going into the widget sup-
ply business who wanted to know what it cost to make widgets
would be wrong to look only at the marginal cost of the last wid-
get made by an existing manufacturer. The prospective new en-
trant really needs to know his likely average cost, at various pro-
jected outputs, and his likely sales volume, because he doesn't
want to enter the market at all unless his average selling price
will exceed his average cost.
So whether one is interested in average costs or marginal
costs depends upon the reason for asking about costs in the first
place. If the question is how much additional income a childless
couple will need in order to maintain their living standard if they
have a child, then the prospective child's marginal cost is indeed
the answer.46 But if the question is whether the custodial house-
hold has sufficient resources to provide the child with an appro-
priate environment, the marginal costs of providing for that child
if he or she were added to some other theoretical household that
does not in fact exist-the intact family-is quite irrelevant. We
could calculate the marginal costs of all the members of the cus-
todial household in this manner, and if we allowed that house-
hold a total budget equal to the sum of their individual marginal
costs, thus calculated, they likely all would starve. Reconstituted
post-dissolution households are like new entries in the widget
business. They are start-ups. They can no more survive on a
budget based on their theoretical marginal costs of adding chil-
dren to an existing household, then could our prospective indus-
trialist profit by selling his first ten widgets at a price equal to
the marginal costs incurred for the last ten made by the current
market leader.
In sum, then, the usual policy debate can be capsuled as a
choice between three possibilities: (1) the continuity-of-marginal-
expenditure model currently employed (knowingly or not) by
most states, (2) the equal living standards model, urged by some
feminist literature but adopted nowhere, and (3) the ALI pro-
posal, a compromise between the two that is similar to Massa-
46 This is in fact the question that Espenshade was answering in his classic study.
See Espenshade, Investing in Children at 2 (cited in note 5). His marginal expenditure
methodology was appropriate to the question with which he was concerned, but it is not
appropriate to the question addressed in the writing of child support guidelines. It ap-
pears to have been applied in this context without serious consideration of whether it was
apt for this purpose.
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chusetts's guideline formulation, and which explicitly rejects
both the marginal expenditure norm and the equal living stan-
dards norm. Notice, however, that regardless of which of these
policy choices one makes, the actual implementation of the cho-
sen policy requires the ability to compare the living standards of
the differently sized households that emerge from the family dis-
solution. The ALI and equal living standards proposals require
such a comparison because comparative living standards are the
benchmark by which their guidelines would be set. While the
continuity-of-marginal-expenditure model makes no explicit ref-
erence to the post-divorce households' relative living standards,
it nonetheless relies just as fully as the first two on the ability to
make that comparison. That is because the equivalence table
methodology it employs to gauge the marginal expenditures on
children requires it: that methodology determines the marginal
child expenditure by calculating how much more the larger fam-
ily with children must spend to achieve the same living standard
as the smaller childless family. Obviously, one can do that only if
one has the ability to determine the expenditure levels at which
families of different sizes in fact achieve equivalent living stan-
dards.47
The ability to gauge the actual impact of any theoretical
guideline model is thus crucial; one could otherwise adopt, for
example, a marginal expenditure model but unknowingly imple-
ment it with guidelines that yield equal living standards.48 Part
III looks more closely at how living standard comparisons are
normally made in practice. I conclude that unavoidable imple-
mentation difficulties make all such comparisons suspect, thus
casting doubt on whether any of the three competing conceptions
can be reliably implemented. First, however, Part II takes a
closer look at the continuity-of-marginal-expenditure principle. I
consider further conceptual flaws with it and conclude that we
should not want to adopt it even if the implementation difficul-
ties could be solved.
47 For example, in their Arizona Report, Policy Studies, Inc. observes that "[tihe
common element of all the estimation methods is that they attempt to allocate expendi-
tures to the children based on a comparison of expenditure patterns in households with
and without children and which are deemed to be equally well off." Venohr and Griffith,
Economic Basis at Appendix I (cited in note 9).
48 This claim is made with respect to the guidelines now in force in some states in
Braver and Stockberger, Child support guidelines (cited in note 36).
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II. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE CONTINUITY-OF-EXPENDITURE RULE
Any economic study prepared for any state's guideline re-
view could exemplify the conceptual difficulties introduced in
Part I of this Article. In this part, however, I will focus on the
report prepared in 2003 for Arizona's quadrennial guideline re-
view by Policy Studies, Inc. ("PSI"). 4 9 Arizona is one of thirty-
three income shares states, and PSI provides guideline-
consulting services to many more states than any other com-
pany.50 Moreover, its basic method-reliance upon estimates of
marginal expenditures generated from living standard compari-
sons using equivalence scales-is used by other guideline con-
sultants as well. The discussion that follows is therefore relevant
to current practices in most states. Most certainly, the economic
analysis contained in any consultant's report seeking to imple-
ment the continuity-of-expenditure principle necessarily makes
methodological choices that have potentially important policy
implications.
To generate estimates of marginal expenditures on children,
consultants compare the living standards of different size house-
holds. This comparison of course requires an independent meas-
ure of living standard, so that one knows, for example, whether a
childless couple spending $55,000 per year lives as well as a cou-
ple with two children spending $75,000 per year.51 This question
interested some economists long before anyone had to draft child
support guidelines. Considering the matter in the nineteenth
century, Ernst Engel, a German economist, noticed two empirical
realities. First, as incomes increase, families of the same size
devote a lower percentage of their total expenditures to food.5 2
Second, as family size increases, families with the same income
devote a higher percentage of their total expenditures to food.5 3
From these two facts Engel posited that the proportion of a fam-
ily's expenditures devoted to food was inversely related to the
family's well-being or standard of living. 54 This intuitively plau-
sible conclusion is the basis of the Engel equivalence scale. 55 A
19 See Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at 2 (cited in note 9).
50 See note 9.
51 See notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
52 Bassi and Barnow, 12 J Pol Anal & Manage at 480-81 (cited in note 15).
53 Id.
54 Much of this discussion is based upon Bassi and Barnow, 12 J Pol Anal & Manage
at 478-97 (cited in note 15).
55 Id at 480-81.
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competing equivalence scale was proposed later by Rothbarth.
He assumed that adults in different households have the same
living standard if they spend the same dollar amount on exclu-
sively adult items.56 That is, a couple with two children has the
same living standard as a childless couple when both couples
spend the same dollar amount on adult items. At one time the
adult items used to implement this equivalence scale were to-
bacco and alcohol.57 Today, adult clothing usually serves as the
measure. 58 While there are other equivalence scale candidates,
Engel and Rothbarth dominate.59
To employ either scale in preparing child support guidelines
based upon the continuity-of-marginal-expenditure principle, one
needs expenditure data on families of different sizes with differ-
ent incomes. 60 One looks, for example, at the percentage of total
expenditures that childless couples earning $60,000 per year on
average devote to groceries, and then finds the income level at
which a couple with two children devote that same percentage of
their total expenditures to groceries. If that income level is
$90,000 per year, one might conclude that a childless couple
earning $60,000 per year would have to spend an additional
$30,000 to maintain the same living standard after adding two
children to their household. (This is a schematic description of
the method; it requires further refinements in actual implemen-
tation, as explained below.) This calculation then leads to the
conclusion that the marginal expenditures on two children in
four-person families earning $90,000 per year is $33,000, or 33
percent. Repeating this process at various income levels and fam-
ily sizes would provide such marginal expenditure estimates
throughout the range contained in the support guidelines.
Essentially the same process would be employed if the
Rothbarth scale is used. One would find the dollar amount that a
childless couple earning, for example, $60,000, spends on adult
clothing, and then locate the income level at which a couple with
two children spends that same dollar amount on adult clothing;
56 Id at 481.
57 Id.
58 Bassi and Barnow, 12 J Pol Anal & Manage at 481 (cited in note 15).
59 For a review of the literature on the various equivalence scales and their use to
capture expenditures on children, see Julie Nelson, Household Equivalence Scales: Theory
versus Policy?, 11 J Labor Econ 471 (1993).
60 1 will discuss in the text accompanying notes 63-80 the quality of the data on which




the rest of the analysis would be the same. It appears that most
states originally used economic analyses employing the Engel
estimator, but over time many switched to the Rothbarth, which
is now dominant.61 PSI will presumably prepare guidelines based
on any estimator requested by the relevant state agency, but its
recent reports seem to suggest use of the Rothbarth estimator.62
The choice of scale is important, because Engel and
Rothbarth produce very different estimates of child expenditures.
The precise figures yielded by either scale vary, depending upon
certain methodological choices. 63 Consistently, however, the
Rothbarth scale yields lower estimates of marginal child expen-
ditures than does Engel. For couples with one, two, or three chil-
dren, the Rothbarth estimates go as low as 11, 19, and 25 per-
cent, respectively, of parental income spent on children. The cor-
responding figures for the high end of Engel estimates is 23, 34,
and 41 percent.6 Given this potentially large discrepancy, one
might reasonably ask which scale is correct. Unfortunately, there
is no empirical basis upon which to choose. One cannot test ei-
ther scale against a known measure of living standard because
there is none (if there were, we would use it rather than either of
these scales).
61 "[Mlany states originally developed their schedules from Engel estimates but have
switched to those based on the Rothbarth estimates. There are 19 states that currently
base their schedules on the Rothbarth estimator and eight states (including Michigan)
that currently base their schedules on the Engel estimator." Jane Venohr, Policy Studies,
Inc., Report on the Michigan Child Support Formula, Report to the Michigan Supreme
Court 4 (April 12, 2002), available online at <http://www.courts.mi.gov/scao/services/focb/
formula/psireport.htm> (visited July 9, 2004). The same report later includes a table
showing that of thirty-three incomes shares states, ten currently employ guidelines based
on the Engel estimator and nineteen the Rothbarth, with four states adopting another
approach. Id at Exhibit 111-4, 33.
62 See id at 16. See also Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at 2 (cited in note 9)
(noting that "the Rothbarth estimator seems to have the most economic validity and plau-
sibility"). For this purpose, as for may others, PSI relies upon the recommendation of
Professor Betson whose early studies established the method PSI uses and whom PSI
retains as a consultant.
63 The methodological choices include decisions as to what counts as an expenditure,
and what does not (for example, mortgage principal payments) and, more fundamentally,
how to correct for unavoidable deficiencies in the available data. These matters are dis-
cussed in detail in Part III of this Article. Note as well that even holding these choices
constant, the estimates produced by either scale appear to vary over time. At least, this is
the assumption that lies behind the federal requirement that states revisit their guide-
lines every four years. It seems implausible that parental practices would vary very much
over any such short time horizon. It is perhaps more plausible that the relative cost of
adult clothing, as compared with other expenditures, might vary, or that tax rules might
change so that net income, and thus expenditures, becomes a higher or lower percentage
of gross income.
64 See Bassi and Barnow, 12 J Pol Anal & Manage at 485 (cited in note 15).
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Indeed, there is good reason to be skeptical of both scales.
Engel necessarily assumes that the relationship between food
consumption, and all other consumption, is the same for children
as for adults. If this assumption is wrong, then the addition of
children to the household will alter the share of expenditures on
food independently of changes in the living standard. But there
is no way to assess the accuracy of this assumption, because any
such determination would require allocating the remaining
household expenditures between children and adults, which is
precisely what we cannot do in any nonarbitrary fashion. (If we
could, then we could use that methodology directly to calculate
the expenditures on children.) The Rothbarth estimator neces-
sarily assumes that expenditures on the measured adult goods
(typically, adult clothing) is a valid proxy for all expenditures
conferring benefits upon the adult household members-that the
benefits conferred on adults from all household expenditures rise
and fall proportionately with adult clothing expenditures. There
is in principle no way to test this assumption empirically either.
Adding children to a household could cause expenditures on
some jointly consumed items to rise or fall entirely in response to
changes in adult demand, in which case the premise of the
Rothbarth estimator would be wrong. But there is no way to
know if this expenditure shift occurs because there is no way to
know what portion of any jointly consumed item to allocate to
adult demand.
Not only are both scales impossible to verify empirically, but
there is reason to question each of them. It is at least plausible to
think that children might be food-intensive, as compared with
adults; if this were true then Engel would systematically overes-
timate marginal expenditures on children. And one might ques-
tion whether expenditures on adult clothing is an equally good
proxy for all adult expenditures in households with children as in
those without children: there is in fact some evidence to suggest
that the addition of children to a household changes the adults'
priorities with respect to their expenditures on themselves, in
ways that would lead the Rothbarth scale to underestimate mar-
ginal expenditures on children.65 Particularly as adult clothing
65 The data suggests that the presence of children in the household leads adults to
substitute goods consumed mostly or only by adults, for goods that are shared with chil-
dren. See id at 483 (citing empirical research by Julie Nelson). If adults in households
with children devote a higher proportion of their expenditures to adult goods, then the
dollar amount of their expenditures will equal that of childless couples at a lower income
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typically constitutes less than 2 percent of all household expen-
ditures, the Rothbarth measure would be very sensitive to such
changes in priorities. 66 Yet it is difficult to get other measures of
purely adult household consumption. Many items are in principle
difficult to allocate among household members (like heat), and
for those (like food) which are in principle allocable, there simply
is no available data that breaks down consumption by household
member. 67 The main available alternative, a measure of adult
consumption of alcohol and cigarettes, has its own distortions,
and in any event, the reported consumption of these items in the
Consumer Expenditure Survey ("CES") is clearly much lower
than the true consumption. 68
It is ultimately the same root problem that prevents an em-
pirical test of either estimator: the vast majority of household
expenditures are devoted to items of joint consumption, and any
empirical test of either estimator requires allocating those ex-
penditures among household members-the very task that the
estimators themselves purport to perform. 69 An empirical test of
their assumptions thus requires lifting oneself by one's boot-
straps. In the end, then, all these estimators necessarily assume
rather than reveal the answer to the central question: how to
allocate joint consumption items among members of the house-
hold. In fact, the allocation of joint consumption items between
different household members is part of a class of problems for
than if the proportion of expenditures devoted to exclusively adult goods was unaffected
by the presence of children. In this case, the Rothbarth equivalence scale underestimates
marginal expenditures on children, by its own terms (although of course, whether it is
actually correct in its relative measurement of living standards across households re-
mains unknown and unknowable).
66 For 2002, married couples with children on average reported expenditures on ap-
parel and apparel services of $2,643, of which $1,664 was spent on children under 16.
This means the total spent on adults in these households averaged about $1,000, while
the mean total expenditures for these households was $57,835. Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, US Department of Labor, Consumer Expenditure Survey, Current Tables, Table 5,
Composition of consumer unit: Average annual expenditures and characteristics (2002),
available online at <httpJ/www.bls.gov/cex/2002Standardcucomp.pdf> (visited July 9,
2004). The full set of tables can be accessed through links available online at
<http'J/www.bls.gov/cex/home.htm#tables>. Tables for prior years, available online
through links at this site, show similar proportions.
67 Bassi and Barnow, 12 J Pol Anal & Manage at 478-97 (cited in note 15).
68 E. Raphael Branch, The Consumer Expenditure Survey: A Comparative Analysis,
117 Monthly Labor Rev No 12 47, 49 (1994) (showing that the CES reported alcohol con-
sumption at 40 percent or less of the PCE figures, and tobacco consumption ranging from
62 to 54 percent of the PCE figures).
69 They purport to perform this task because their implied definition of equal living
standards is equal consumption of goods by the adults in the two households being com-
pared.
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which any solution is unavoidably arbitrary.70 That is, the diffi-
culty goes beyond the inability to test empirically the estimators'
assumed allocation rule. It is also the case that there is no inher-
ent theoretical or principled basis upon which to allocate joint
consumption items among household members. To illustrate this
point, I examine further the allocation implied by PSI's method.
Recall that Engel and Rothbarth share the assumption that
each household member should be allocated only his or her mar-
ginal consumption of the jointly consumed item; they differ only
in their assumptions (untestable) of how to measure that mar-
ginal consumption. A marginal consumption rule determines the
household members' share of jointly consumed items according to
the order in which they are considered. That is, the entire base
cost is allocated to the first household member considered, while
only additional costs are allocated to the other household mem-
bers. In the limiting case there are no additional costs, and thus
nothing is allocated to any household member beyond the first.
For example, the home is heated at a cost of $200 per month, but
the marginal expenditure on heat associated with adding a per-
son to the household is essentially zero. If I assume the house-
hold begins with the parent, and the child is added, then the
heating cost of the child is zero. But if we assume the custodial
household begins with the child, whose presence defines it as the
custodial household, then the child's cost for heat is $200 per
month and the custodial parent's cost is zero.
No inherent or objective principle of economics or of cost al-
location tells you which person to start with, or whether this en-
tire approach makes sense. That choice must therefore be made
by reference to the policy purpose for making the inquiry, not by
appeal to economic methodology. If the inquiry into cost alloca-
tion is prompted by the need to write child support guidelines,
then neither of the choices forced upon us by the marginal ex-
penditure method make sense: the child's share of the heat bill
70 Conceptually, the allocation ofjoint consumption items among household members
presents the same problem as allocating responsibility for an injury among its multiple
causes. For a discussion of why any allocation is inherently arbitrary, see David Kaye and
Mikel Aickin, A Comment on Causal Apportionment, 13 J Legal Stud 191 (1984). The
same issue also comes up when a court is asked to allocate property between marital and
separate components by identifying the share attributable to labor with the share attrib-
utable to capital. See the discussion in ALI, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution §
4.05, Cmt b and Reporter's Notes to Cmt b. The arbitrary nature of the accounting con-
ventions used for this problem has also been addressed in the accounting literature. See
the sources gathered in William Kruskal, Terms of Reference: Singular Confusion About
Multiple Causation, 15 J Legal Stud 427, 435 n 9 (1986).
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should be neither all nor nothing. An acceptable living environ-
ment for the child requires heat, and any child support regime
must be concerned with whether there will be resources to pay
the heat bill. It must also be concerned with allocating the heat
bill fairly as between the parents, especially in light of the fact
that the heat benefits all members of the custodial household,
not just the children subject to the support order. One might
think, as does the ALI, that any resolution of this question must
necessarily balance both these concerns. 71 One might also believe
that the parents' relative contribution to the heat bill ought to
depend, at least in part, on their relative capacity to pay for it.72
Such considerations suggest that it would be the rare case in
which one concluded that either parent's share should be 0 or
100 percent, but those are the only choices offered by the mar-
ginal expenditure methodology.
The United States Department of Agriculture develops esti-
mates for child expenditures that do not use a marginal expendi-
ture methodology and do not attempt global comparisons of liv-
ing standards between households of different size.73 It instead
examines categories of expenditures separately, allocating some,
such as housing and transportation, on a per capita rather than
marginal expenditure basis.74 Others, like food and health care,
are allocated among family members using proportions derived
from specialized surveys. 75 Finally, some items that are entirely
child related are reported in the Consumer Expenditure Survey
and allocated entirely to children, such as children's clothing,
education, and childcare.76 This method avoids many of the arbi-
trary choices inherent in the marginal expenditure approaches,
but it requires other ones. For example, per capita allocations of
71 See text accompanying notes 38-39.
72 See text accompanying notes 42-44.
73 Mark Lino, Expenditures on Children by Families: 2001 Annual Report, Center for
Nutrition Policy and Promotion, US Department of Agriculture, Miscellaneous Publica-
tion No 1528-2001 (2002). For a published version of the prior year's equivalent study, see
Mark Lino, Expenditures on children by families: U.S. Department of Agriculture esti-
mates and Alternative Estimators, 11 J Legal Econ 31, 31 (2001). Lino argues that the
Agriculture Department's approach is a better basis for support guidelines than alterna-
tive approaches using a marginal expenditure methodology. Id at 35.
74 Id at 35.
75 Id at 32-33. For food it relies on the National Food Consumption Survey conducted
by the Agriculture Department, and for health care it relies on the National Medical Care
Utilization and Expenditure Survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services.
76 Lino, 11 J Legal Econ at 34 (cited in note 73).
167] 195
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
housing and transportation expenses may in some sense seem
reasonable, but are ultimately no more defensible on any objec-
tive theoretical basis than the arbitrary choices required by the
marginal expenditure method. In the case of small children, one
might imagine that large portions of a home are used primarily
by adults, and should perhaps be allocated entirely to them. Or,
one might imagine that adults with children pay a premium for
homes in child-friendly locations with better schools and easy
access to parks or other child-centered recreational opportuni-
ties, so that the children's presence in the household accounts for
more than their per capita share of the housing cost. Or finally,
one might argue that the minor children require a custodian, so
that all the housing expenses should be attributable to the chil-
dren (in a household consisting exclusively of children and the
custodial parent).
Estimates based on the Department of Agriculture method-
ology are near or above the Engel estimates, depending upon
when they were completed. 77 PSI rejects them out of hand be-
cause they are not marginal expenditures.78 In other words, PSI
begins and ends with the belief that a marginal expenditure
model is appropriate; it does not examine that belief or consider
any alternatives. Nor in fact is there any reason to think an
economist would possess the expertise necessary to choose
among the alternatives, given that the choice must necessarily be
made on the basis of child support policy, rather than upon any
principle of economic analysis.
In sum, we have first seen that guideline consultants today
all assume that the correct benchmark for the appropriate level
77 See Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at 12 (table) (cited in note 9).
78 This point is made in their discussion of why they reject the Department of Agri-
culture estimates (which they referred to as the CNPP estimates):
The CNPP estimates are not deemed suitable because they rely on an average
cost approach. The division of some expenditures between parents and children
assumes a conclusion about the real allocation of those expenditures, which is
particularly bothersome for setting child support awards. Child support is
commonly understood to provide for the additional costs of children. It seems
very unlikely that the costs of children would proportionately equal the adult's
initial costs.
Id at 12. The criticism of the CNPP for its assumptions about how to allocate costs might
suggest to the reader that the marginal expenditure approach used by PSI was not also
based upon assumptions, as of course in fact it is. The marginal expenditure approach,
the report says, is "commonly understood" as the proper basis of child support, but there
is no attempt to explain why the marginal cost assumption better reflects proper child
support policy than the assumptions that underlie the Agriculture Department estimates.
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of child support is the marginal expenditure on children in intact
households. Treating the child as the marginal member of the
household has the effect of excluding most of the household pub-
lic goods from the child support calculation.7 9 There is no intrin-
sic principle of economics that requires this treatment. While it
vindicates one legitimate interest-that of the noncustodial par-
ent in avoiding subsidy of the other parent via child support-it
attaches no weight to the child's legitimate interest in living in a
household with an economic level not grossly below that of either
parent. Second, assuming one nonetheless wishes to employ a
marginal expenditure methodology, we have seen that there is no
empirical or principled basis for choosing among the available
equivalence scales, which yield very different estimates of mar-
ginal expenditures. The increasingly common reliance upon the
Rothbarth scale is effectively a policy choice that it is better to
err with support guidelines that are too low, than to err with
support guidelines that are too high.80 But that is precisely the
kind of choice that needs be made by the public agency responsi-
ble for the guidelines, not by the economic consultant.
This Part has focused on two conceptual difficulties with
current practices for producing guidelines: the unexamined as-
sumption that marginal expenditure analysis is appropriate, and
the reliance upon unverifiable equivalence scales such as
79 Household public goods are those goods, like heat, which do not cost more to pro-
vide for all household members than for one. The exclusion of the base amount of joint
expenditures also poses the same problem as the exclusion of these household public
goods. A focus on marginal expenditures excludes from the tabulation of child expendi-
tures the initial outlay on items that cost more when household members are added. For
example, the household may not purchase additional automobiles when children are
added, but might incur a small additional cost if, for example, the car is driven more
miles and thus consumes more gasoline and requires more maintenance.
80 PSI has provided state agencies with estimates based on the Engel equivalence
scale and the Department of Agriculture approach (which is not based on marginal ex-
penditures), when so requested. Telephone conversation with Jane Venohr (Dec 23, 2003).
It nonetheless appears that PSI urges its clients to adopt Rothbarth-based estimates, in
part because it reports that Betson favors them. See Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis
at 11 (cited in note 9).
[T]he 1990 Betson-Engel estimates approach per capita (i.e., average cost) esti-
mates of child-rearing expenditures [and therefore] appear unreasonable . . . marginal
costs should be lower than average costs .... the implausible results from the Engel
methodology renders the Rothbarth estimator to be the preferred choice...
It is true that if one accepts that marginal costs should be the test, the Engel esti-
mates appear high-but that hardly demonstrates that the Rothbarth estimates are more
accurate. PSIs own presentation of the most recent Engel estimates are that parents
spend, on one, two and three children respectively, 30 percent, 44 percent, and 52 percent
of total expenditures. This is lower than average cost, which would be 33 percent, 50
percent, and 60 percent.
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Rothbarth and Engel as its best metric. One further conceptual
issue must be acknowledged, although I do not explore it here.
All the methodological alternatives for equating household living
standards assume that the child's presence in a household re-
duces the parents' living standards by the cost of the child ex-
penditures, however they are measured. The definition of living
standard implicit in this approach excludes consideration of any
nonfinancial benefit that the child's presence may confer on a
parent. One can reasonably argue that this is a cramped and un-
realistic measure of living standard, and that in judging whether
a child support order treats the parents fairly one must consider
the positive value of the child's presence as well as the dollar
consequences. Certainly, both parents act as if they believe the
child's presence matters. Child support obligors who feel their
relationship with their child has been impaired by the custodial
arrangement often feel keenly that the support obligation is un-
fair for this reason.8 ' Child support obligees generally seek the
role of custodial parent, even if they believe the child support
system is financially inadequate, presumably because they an-
ticipate that custody will confer what they regard as significant
nonfinancial benefits. Obviously, no trade off of nonfinancial
benefits for the custodial parent, against support dollars, can be
justified in terms of the child's interests. But if the ultimate child
support award must reflect a compromise between the child's
interests and a fair balance of the parental interests, it can be
argued that the nonfinancial benefits of custody should be in-
cluded in the calculus.
Yet once one enters this realm, one must also acknowledge
that the child's presence has nonfinancial costs as well, and these
are also ignored by the standard of living analysis. The responsi-
bility of the primary custodian necessarily entails uncompen-
sated loss of leisure as well as inevitable constraints on a variety
of personal life choices. It may not always be clear whether the
overall result is a net nonfinancial benefit or cost. In addition,
the magnitude of any gain or loss seems likely to vary with the
child. No existing child support law overtly adjusts the amount of
child support to account for this nonfinancial factor, whether as
an addition or a subtraction. Examining whether such an ad-
justment is justified, and if so, how it might be measured, is be-
81 Jessica Pearson and Jean Anhalt, Examining the Connection Between Child Access
and Child Support, 32 Farn & Conciliation Cts Rev 93, 93-109 (1994).
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yond this Article's scope. I simply note here that it is in fact ex-
cluded from the definition of living standard as child support
guidelines are currently implemented.
III. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS IN THE MARGINAL EXPENDITURE
METHODOLOGY
A. Introduction
Implementing the marginal expenditure methodology for
constructing child support guidelines requires data that relates
expenditures and income for families of different incomes and
compositions. The CES conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics ("BLS") is the only comprehensive source of such data now
available, and PSI necessarily relies upon it, either directly or by
incorporating the estimates provided by Professor Betson.82 Yet
there are flaws in the CES data with potential significance for
guideline writing. PSI's reports acknowledge some of these flaws,
and adopt conventions for dealing with them. Other flaws are not
acknowledged.8 3 In addition, PSI makes certain choices in its use
of the data that have policy implications. This Part examines
these data issues. While it focuses on the use of CES data by PSI,
the data problems have broader relevance because they pose
equivalent difficulties for any method that relies upon them. The
conclusion is not necessarily that CES data should not be used,
given the paucity of alternatives. But given the policy implica-
tions of these data defects and any corrective strategies, policy-
makers need to be aware of these issues and involved in their
resolution.
I begin by revisiting how PSI uses this data. Suppose, like
PSI, one uses a version of the Rothbarth equivalence scale in
82 Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at 12 (cited in note 9).
83 Rather than prepare its own child expenditure estimates, PSI generally relies on
work by Professor Betson. It is not always clear from reading Psrs reports which items it
has calculated and which have been adopted from Betson. Jane Venohr, the author of all
the PSI reports referenced in this essay, advises that Table 1-3 in Appendix 1 of the Ari-
zona report is provided to PSI in the form therein reproduced, so that all the calculations
that precede the figures contained in this table are performed by Betson and not PSI.
Telephone conversation with Jane Venohr (Dec 23, 2003). Because PSI adopts the Betson
methodology, I sometimes attribute these figures, and the methodological choices that
produce them, to PSI even though they have not themselves performed them. This seems
particularly appropriate where the description of Betson's methodology on which I rely is
contained in the PSI reports. In some cases I rely also on Betson's original 1990 report on
child expenditures, which details his methods. Where convenient, however, I have at-
tempted to distinguish Betson's and PSI's relative contributions to the final product.
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which the metric is the dollar amount spent on adult clothing.
Suppose further that one finds that the average annual expendi-
ture on adult clothing by childless couples earning $60,000 per
year is $2,200 per year.84 One might then look at the data on
couples with two children to find the income level at which such
a four-person family spends $2,200 per year on adult clothing.
Suppose that income level is $90,000 per year. The assumption of
the Rothbarth scale is that these two families enjoy the same
living standard.8 5 As an initial matter one might therefore think
the marginal expenditures on children in families with two chil-
dren and incomes of $90,000 per year is $30,000, or 33 percent of
their income.8 6 While the Betson analysis on which PSI relies
uses this basic approach, it makes certain refining adjustments
to reflect the fact that the $30,000 gap in our example will in-
clude some components that are not in fact child expenditures,
and will include some child expenditures that are not included in
the basic guideline figures because they are added on separately
when the actual support award is calculated.8 7
Most fundamentally, the income figures used in our example
are gross incomes, and some of the gross income gap between
these families will inevitably go to taxes, including FICA, rather
than child expenditures. Betson therefore subtracts taxes from
the gross income figures to arrive at net income, using the dollar
84 Actually, this figure is high--it turns out that adult clothing expenditures are typi-
cally 2 percent or less of total household expenditures. See text accompanying notes 65-
66.
85 See Betson, Alternative Estimates at 10 (cited in note 31). This is the basic ap-
proach as outlined by Professor Betson. In this excerpt Betson refers to "adult goods"
rather than adult clothing. Because of limitations in the available data, the only adult
goods on which data is available is adult clothing, tobacco, and alcohol, and there are
particular problems in relying upon the last two.
86 Essentially the same process would be employed if the Engel scale were used. The
only difference is that one would look at the percentage of all expenditures that are de-
voted to groceries, rather than at the dollar amount spent on adult clothing. Having
found that percentage for the childless couple earning $60,000, one would then look at
two-child families to find the income level at which that same percentage is spent on
groceries. Suppose it is $90,000. One would then conclude that the marginal expenditure
on children in two-child families earning $90,000 is $30,000, or 33 percent of their in-
come.
87 What follows is a description of their method so far as it was possible for the au-
thor to determine. The method is not always clearly explained in the consultant's report,
see Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at Appendix I, Table 1-3 (cited in note 9). The
allocation of responsibility between PSI employees, and Professor Betson, with whom
they consult, is in particular often difficult to ascertain. The description of PSI's method
provided here was aided considerably by telephone conversations between the author and
Jane Venohr, to whom the author expresses his thanks.
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amount of taxes paid as reported in the CES itself.8 8 In addition,
families with different incomes and different compositions may
deploy different amounts of their net income to savings or other
items which Betson or PSI believe are appropriately excluded as
not representing child expenditures. PSI therefore calculates a
consumption figure for each category of family, by subtracting
from the total expenditures as reported in the CES, items that
Betson and PSI believe appropriate to exclude.8 9 These subtrac-
tions include savings, pension contributions, "personal insur-
ance" and "contributions." These are CES categories; Betson
simply subtracts the amounts that CES reports for these catego-
ries.90 "Contributions" apparently includes voluntary transfers to
other individuals, such as gifts to third parties, including adult
children.91 "Personal insurance" does not include health insur-
ance or automobile insurance; it does include life insurance. 92
PSI also deducts from the consumption figure expenditures on
health care for children and on childcare. 93 This deduction is ap-
propriate because Arizona, like most states, treats these ex-
penses separately from the basic child support obligation arrived
at by applying the grid in the guidelines. 94 This separate treat-
ment allows for case-by-case determinations of these costs, which
may vary considerably from family to family. Since each obligor's
share of these expenses is added to the grid-based support order
at the end, they should not be included in the basic calculation in
the grid.
The amount arrived at after making these subtractions from
total expenditures is called total consumption.95 In our example,
suppose total consumption for the family of four with a gross in-
come of $90,000 per year is $70,000, and that total consumption
for the childless couple with a gross income of $60,000 per year is
$50,000. (Recall that in this hypothetical example we assume
these two families have the same dollar expenditures on adult
clothing and thus enjoy the same living standard according to
the Rothbarth scale.) In that case, one would conclude that mar-
88 For the purpose of this calculation, union dues are treated as taxes.
89 Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at Appendix I, Table 1-4 (cited in note 9).
90 See id.
91 See BLS, CES Current Table 5 (cited in note 66).
92 Id.
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ginal child expenditure in the family of four with a gross income
of $90,000 per year is $20,000, the difference between these two
consumption figures. One could state marginal child expenditure
as a proportion of net income. If, for example, the family of four
in our illustration had a net income of $82,000 per year, then the
child expenditures of $20,000 would constitute 20/82, or 24.4 per-
cent, of net income. 96 One can imagine repeating such calcula-
tions over a wide income range and for families of varying size to
produce proportions of net income spent on children for a full
array. These calculations can be treated as data points on a
curve, smoothed to allow the construction of the familiar child
support grid. The adjustments made to achieve this smoothing,
as well as some other adjustments, can be put aside at this point.
One complication worth noting, however, is that the number of
families surveyed in any one year may be too small to provide
reliable figures once the total number is broken into families of
different size and income. This problem is solved by aggregating
data collected over a three-year period.
This process obviously requires data that shows expenditure
patterns broken down by family composition and income, and the
CES is the only source of such information. The CES has been
conducted in various forms and at various intervals since 1888,
when it provided information for tariff negotiations with
Europe.97 It assumed its current form in 1972. Panels (groups of
individuals who are surveyed periodically) are formed from a na-
tional probability sample of American households.98 Panel mem-
bers are interviewed five times each, at three-month intervals.99
96 According to Jane Venohr, PSI relies on figures Betson provides, that state the
average parental expenditures on children, within each income group, as a percent of
average total consumption expenditures in that income group. It then reduces these per-
centages by figures Betson also provides for the expenditures by income group on child
care, and on child medical expenses (also stated as a percent of average total consump-
tion). PSI then multiplies this adjusted consumption percentage by yet another figure
Betson provides, for average consumption as a percentage of average net income, for each
income group. This final calculation is PSI's estimate of child expenditures as a percent-
age of net income, for each income group. Telephone conversation with Jane Venohr (Dec
23, 2003). The Betson-provided figures are in Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at
Appendix I, Table 1-3 (cited in note 9).
9' Geoffrey Paulin and David Ferraro, Imputing Income in the Consumer Expenditure
Survey, 117 Monthly Labor Rev No 12 23, 23-24 (1994).
98 The description here of the survey methodology is taken from Geoffrey Paulin and
Yoon G. Lee, Expenditures of Single Parents: How Does Gender Figure In?, 125 Monthly





The first interview forms a baseline; the four that follow provide
data for the survey. 100 This interview component of the CES is
meant to collect information on recurring expenditures, such as
rent or insurance.1°1 One might assume that panel members are
more likely to remember the cost of such regularly recurring
items more accurately than they remember the cost of items with
changing prices. Nonetheless, the interview component is not
limited to such recurring purchases. While there is also a diary
component of the CES survey, in which respondents are asked to
keep a written record of certain expenditures as they occur, 1 2
the interview component covers up to 95 percent of all expendi-
tures, and appears in some regards to be more accurate. 10 3 One
can nonetheless imagine why interview data of this kind might
be incomplete or inaccurate in certain respects. Depending upon
the use to which it is put, any particular flaw may have more or
less importance. I consider below several flaws that seem likely
to affect its use for constructing child support guidelines.
B. Underreporting of Income in the CES Data
The CES has a recurring difficulty with panel members un-
derreporting their income. In general, only data from "complete
income reporters" is used in the compilations discussed here, in
Betson's and PSI's calculations, and in many of CES's published
tables. But a household is classified a "complete income reporter"
so long as it provides at least one major source of income for at
least one household member. 10 4 Published accounts show that in
most years, between 85 percent and 90 percent of respondent
100 Id.
101 Id. See also Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor, Consumer Ex-
penditure Survey, Frequently Asked Questions, available online at
<http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxfaqs.htm#qlO> (visited July 9, 2004).
102 The diary component has participating families record expenditures for two con-
secutive weeks. Paulin and Ferraro, 117 Monthly Labor Rev at 30 (cited in note 97).
103 The "interview [component] collects detailed data on an estimated 60 to 70 percent
of total household expenditures. In addition, global estimates, that is, expense patterns
for a 3-month period, are obtained for food and other selected items. These global esti-
mates account for an additional 20 to 25 percent of total expenditures." Paulin and Lee,
125 Monthly Labor Rev at 32, n 30 (cited in note 98), quoting Bureau of Labor Statistics,
US Department of Labor, Consumer Expenditure Survey, Report 935, 256, Consumer
Expenditure Survey 1996-1997 (Sept 1999). The percentage of "incomplete" income re-
porters is higher in the diary component than in the interview; it is thought by some that
respondents may be more willing to report income in the interview, where the income
questions are not posed until after the demographic and expenditure questions have been
answered. Paulin and Ferraro, 117 Monthly Labor Rev at 30 (cited in note 97).
104 Paulin and Ferraro, 117 Monthly Labor Rev at 24 (cited in note 97).
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households are classified as complete income reporters by this
definition. 10 5 Yet, a household that fails to report additional earn-
ings by the household member for whom a major income source
is reported, or which omits even "major source" income earned by
other household members, is still classified a "complete reporter"
because a major income source has been reported for one house-
hold member. It is widely believed, therefore, that underreport-
ing is common even among "complete reporter" households.
Moreover, after 1994, complete income reporters began declining
as a percent of all households, falling to between 75 and 81 per-
cent between 1995 and 2001.106 One indication of this income-
underreporting problem is that the CES shows expenditures in
excess of reported income for about half the respondents-those
in the lower half of the reported income range. 10 7 In any given
year, of course, a household may spend more than its income by
incurring debt or spending down capital, but an excess of expen-
ditures over income for half the population, that persists for dec-
ades, cannot be explained in this way.108 Thus the general belief
105 Id at 25.
106 Email from Geofrey Paulin, Senior Economist, Bureau of Labor Statistics (April 21,
2004) (on file with U Chi Legal F). Beginning in 2002, respondents were offered the choice
of saying their income fell within a bracketed range, rather than providing an exact fig-
ure for it. In that year complete income reporters were 82% of all households. Id.
107 Id. The authors report this result consistently for families in the lower two quin-
tiles from 1980 on, the earliest year for which they compile this data. Paulin and Ferraro,
117 Monthly Labor Rev at 26, Chart 2 (cited in note 97). For the third quintile-those
between the 40th and 60th percentile in reported income--the reported average income
hovers around or just above the reported expenditures. The most recently available data
shows that mean reported expenditures exceed mean reported income (net of reported
income taxes) for all households with mean reported gross incomes below $40,000. House-
holds in the $40,000 to $50,000 gross income range report a mean net income only
slightly above mean expenditures, suggesting that the net income and expenditure lines
cross somewhere in the middle of this group. Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department
of Labor, Consumer Expenditure Survey, Current Tables, Table 2, Income before taxes:
Average annual expenditures and characteristics (2002), available online at
<http'//www.bls.gov/cex/2002/Standard/income.pdf> (visited July 9, 2004). The range of
incomes for the middle quintile of households is $28,344 to $46,506. See Bureau of Labor
Statistics, US Department of Labor, Consumer Expenditure Survey, Current Tables,
Table 1, Quintiles of income before taxes: Average annual expenditures and characteristics
(2002), available online at <http://www.bls.gov/cex/2002/Standard/quintile.pdf> (visited
July 9, 2004). It thus appears that the point at which the expenditure and income lines
cross is near and probably above 50th percentile in the income distribution. All CES ta-
bles including these two are available online at <http://www.bls.gov/cex/home.htm#>
(visited July 9, 2004).
108 Unemployed persons presumably spend down capital regularly, and would thus
report expenditures in excess of income, but they are not half the population. Some por-
tion of retired persons may be spending down capital as well, although many of these will
not be couples, and thus will not figure in the comparative analysis that PSI undertakes
in its implementation of the Rothbarth equivalence scale. Students who pay tuition with
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among researchers, including economists at the BLS itself, is
that income is systematically underreported in the CES data
set. 0 9
PSI is fully aware of this problem. 10 But their report to Ari-
zona says they make no adjustments to deal with it because
there are "no theoretically-based methods to adjust income for
this problem.""' Yet the same page of their report describes the
adjustments they do make to deal with this income discrep-
ancy. 12 Recall that for each income range, PSI multiplies Bet-
son's figure for child expenditures, expressed as a proportion of
total consumption, by total consumption as a proportion of net
income. 113 This gives a measure of child expenditures as a pro-
portion of net income. The problem, however, is that income un-
derreporting is so massive in the lower income categories that
even though total consumption is only a subset of total expendi-
tures, it still exceeds reported net income in the bottom five of
PSI's fourteen income groups, thus producing ratios greater than
one.114 Calculations using these ratios would therefore yield child
expenditures figures that are even higher, as a percent of net
income, than as a percent of consumption. The consequence
would be support guidelines that set extraordinarily high sup-
port obligations for obligors in the lower 40 percent of the income
distribution.
PSI (through Professor Betson) avoids the most extreme re-
sults by arbitrarily capping the ratio at one, for the five lowest
income groups." 5 Because data from the sixth group yields a ra-
tio of .999, it is not affected by this cap. Yet a ratio of .999 is also
funds received from their parents may have expenditures including tuition, greater than
income, depending upon whether they receive payments from their parents regularly, or
in single payment lump sums. (BLS treats regular payments as income to the students,
but not lump sum payments, which are treated as "contributions" from their parents.)
Email from Geoffrey Paulin, Bureau of Labor Statistics (April 21, 2004) (on file with the
University of Chicago Legal Forum). Again, these students will not usually figure in PSrs
analysis because they will not usually be couples.
109 See Paulin and Ferraro, 125 Monthly Labor Rev at 23, 24 (cited in note 98). See
also Email from Professor Claire Brown, Department of Economics, University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley (on file with author).
110 See Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at Appendix I, 3 (cited in note 9) ("Staff




113 See note 33.
114 See Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at Appendix I, Table 1-3 (cited in note 9).
115 Id.
167] 205
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
not possible unless the group's average expenditures (necessarily
greater than its consumption) is more than its income. In short,
there is a serious problem of income underreporting for at least
six income groups out of fourteen, or 42 percent of the income
groups, and this data defect affects PSI's child support calcula-
tions. Capping the ratio at one ameliorates but does not solve the
problem. PSI's calculated child expenditures for these six groups
vary from 33 percent of net income, to 36.78 percent, at the low-
est income level. 116 The eight higher income groups are all much
lower. 1 7 The consequence is very high child support awards, in
relation to income, for the six lowest income groups. The concern
is that these high awards do not reflect disproportionately high
spending on children by these income groups in the real world,
but are instead an artifact of defective income data for these
groups, such that given levels of marginal child expenditures are
associated, in the data, with income levels that are lower than in
fact they are.
It appears that income underreporting is probably less of a
problem with the eight higher income groups."18 Of course, the
fact that for these groups expenditures do not exceed income does
not necessarily mean that income is not underreported. The sav-
ings rate at higher incomes could be large enough that reported
income could be below actual income but still higher than re-
ported expenditures. This result is even more possible if expendi-
tures are also underreported. Indeed, we shall see below that
there is reason to think that at the higher income levels, expen-
ditures are disproportionately underreported. Ultimately, given
PSI's methods, what matters most is the relative proportions of
underreporting of income as compared to expenditures. For the
lower 42 percent of the income distribution, the problem appears
serious because it seems likely that income is disproportionately
underreported. Moreover, we shall see below in Part III.C the
opposite problem-serious and disproportionate underreporting
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 One study has shown that if the survey respondents are divided into seven groups
according to their level of reported expenditures, the two lowest are significantly more
likely than the rest to be "incomplete income reporters," in BLS's terminology. While this
also does not necessarily mean that the complete income reporters in the low expenditure
groups are underreporting income at a higher rate than other respondents, it is sugges-
tive. Thesia Garner and Laura Blanciforti, Household Income Reporting: An Analysis of
U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey Data, Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of
Labor, Working Paper 255, 13 (July 1994).
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of expenditures-seems to occur in the upper 20 percent, with
the result that estimates of child expenditures are off in both
groups, but in opposite directions.
For some time PSI has recommended child support orders
that are a much higher percent of income at the lower income
levels than at the higher levels, on the basis of its conclusion that
this regressive schedule reflects actual expenditure patterns in
intact families. Its most recent reports enlarge the gap by rec-
ommending increases in the support obligations of low-income
obligors, and reductions in the support obligations of high-income
obligors.119 Yet, beginning with Espenshade, observers have gen-
erally agreed that marginal child expenditures are a fairly con-
stant percentage of total expenditures across a very wide income
range. 120 PSI does not take issue with this observation. Its con-
clusion that marginal child expenditures decline precipitously
with rising income derives instead from its reliance upon CES
data that shows a steep drop off in expenditures as a percentage
of income as income rises. We have now seen that this drop off
results in important part from the fact that the CES dispropor-
tionately underreports income for nearly half of all households-
those in the lower half of the income distribution. The next Sub-
part examines the expenditure data in the CES, and explains
why the opposite problem seems likely for the upper fifth of all
households.
C. Underreporting of Expenditures in the CES Data
While CES data shows expenditures exceeding income for
the lower half of the earnings distribution, it also appears that,
as a general matter, expenditures are underreported. A study by
a BLS economist compared expenditures as reported in the CES
with data on expenditures from producers ("PCE") on the market
value of goods and services purchased. 121 Because the CES and
PCE sources do not employ precisely comparable classification
schemes, she made adjustments for some comparisons, and could
119 See Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at 14 (cited in note 9) (stating that "the
more recent Betson-Rothbarth estimates indicate a greater decline" in expenditures as a
proportion of income, as income rises).
120 Thus, reports of marginal child expenditures as a percent of all expenditures are
generally reported by family size but not by income or expenditure level. See, for example,
Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at 8 (cited in note 9).
121 Branch, Monthly Labor Review at 48-49 (cited in note 68).
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not make comparisons of all goods and services. 122 Nonetheless,
she obtained reasonably good comparisons for many consumption
categories.
The ratios indicate that CE [Survey] estimates for almost
all categories of consumption are lower than PCE esti-
mates. PCE data are based mostly on administrative and
establishment data, which we expect to be more complete,
whereas CE [Survey] data are collected via a household
survey, which is subject to underreporting. In addition,
the lower CE estimates may reflect broader population
coverage in the PCE. 12 3
CES data on expenditures for rent, and the purchase price of
automobiles, are quite close to the PCE data; it seems plausible
to think that these items would suffer relatively less from prob-
lems of recall in the CES interviews. By contrast, CES reports on
things like purchases of food, entertainment, and personal care
products fell well below the levels reported in the PCE. Of per-
haps particular concern, given PSI's use of the Rothbarth equiva-
lence scale, is that for the four-year period for which these com-
parisons were made, CES estimates for clothing purchases were
between 80 and 85 percent of the PCE estimates. 12 4
There is reason to think that underreporting of expenditures
presents a particular problem with upper income families, for
whom the CES data implies highly implausible savings rates.
Consider, for example, the CES data on households whose re-
ported gross income falls between $70,000 and $90,000.125 The
mean gross income of this group (before income taxes) is $78,619;
mean income after income taxes is $73,971.126 All remaining
taxes (such as FICA and property taxes) are included among the
122 Id.
123 Id at 48.
124 The item breakdown is provided in Branch's paper. See id at 49, Table 1. The cate-
gory that includes clothing also includes services related to clothing, such as laundry and
dry cleaning. The traditional consumption category employed in implementing the
Rothbarth measure of "adult expenditures" was not adult clothing but alcohol and to-
bacco. Not surprisingly, perhaps, Branch's study shows that expenditures on these items
are among those most significantly underreported in the CES.
125 Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor, Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey, Table 7050, Income before taxes: Average annual expenditures and characteristics
(2001-2002), available online at <http://www.bls.gov/cex/2002/highincomelhincome.pdf>
(visited July 9, 2004). Links to most BLS tables, including this one, are available online
at <http://www.bls.gov/cex/home.htm> (visited July 9, 2004).
126 BLS, CES Table 7050 (cited in note 125).
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CES expenditure categories, as are contributions to pension
plans. Total expenditures for this group, (which thus includes
other taxes and pensions) average $60,740.127 To find true figures
for after-tax income, one needs to deduct FICA from the CES in-
come figures, and then also exclude it from expenditures. 128 If
one assumes a mean FICA payment of $5,500 for this group,
then its mean net after-tax income is $68,471, and expenditures
are $ 55,240.129 This leaves a gap of $13,231-the difference be-
tween the mean after-tax income and the mean total expendi-
ture-unaccounted for. One might guess that about $2,350 of
this gap is explained as underreporting of income taxes paid. 130
That assumption leaves a gap of $10,881. Because CES purports
to record all expenditures, the implication is that households in
this income range are on average saving $10,881 annually, not
including pension contributions (because those have already
been counted as expenditures by the CES). This implied dollar
savings of $10,881 (beyond any pension contribution) is 16 per-
cent of net income. Such a savings rate is implausible. 1 1 There is
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 CES reports that this income group "spends" an average of $7,589 on FICA plus
pension contributions. The current FICA rate is 7.65% on the first $87,000 of employee
wage earnings; some forms of income, such as interest or capital gain income, produce no
FICA tax. The estimate of $5,500 assumes that some of this group's mean income is not
subject to FICA, and that some of the reported expenditures in this category constitute
pension contributions.
130 CES of course relies on the respondents' self-report for their figures on both income
and income taxes paid. For the $70,000 to $90,000 group, the CES figures show a mean
personal taxes of $4,648 on the mean average income of $78,619, which includes federal,
state, and local taxes. That is an effective average tax rate of 5.9 percent. According to the
Congressional Budget Office, the effective average federal income tax rate, under the
2000 tax law, for families with children with a mean income of $83,100, is 7.1 percent.
See Congressional Budget Office, Effective Federal Tax Rates, 1979-1997 Tables Gla,
Glc, G-2c (2002), available online at <http:/www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?-
index=3089&sequence=l1#tableG-2a> (visited July 9, 2004). If one looks at CBO data for
all households, rather than at just households with children, one finds that for house-
holds in the fourth quintile, with a mean income of $65,600, the average effective income
tax rate is also 7.1 percent. It seems unlikely that this number will differ widely for the
income group examined here. See id at Tables G-la and Table G-lc. A rate of 7.1 percent
would yield an income tax liability of $5,582. To that must be added state and local in-
come taxes. If those are a quarter of the federal taxes, about $1,400, then we would have
a total tax liability of $6,982, or $2,350 more than reported in the CES.
131 The Economic Report of the President, Table B-30, Disposition of Personal Income,
1959-2002 (Feb 2003), available online at <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget-
fy04/erp.html> (visited July 9, 2004), reports personal savings as a percent of disposable
income; the rate varies considerably by each calendar quarter, but within a range, for
2001-2002, of .08 to 4.0 percent. It defines savings as "personal income less personal tax
and nontax payments." The report also shows a net household savings rate of 4 percent;
this includes contributions to both employer pension plans and individual retirement
210 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2004:
no similar gap between income and expenditures at a lower-
income levels (indeed, as explained above, the gap is in the oppo-
site direction), further suggesting that the problem of expendi-
ture underreporting is particularly acute for higher-income fami-
lies. One possible explanation for this difference is that upper-
income households average more members, and there is evidence
that expenditure underreporting generally rises with household
membership. 132
Expenditure underreporting yields lower estimates of child
expenditures, and thus lower child support guidelines. 133 If there
is disproportionately more expenditure underreporting in higher
income households, the result will be disproportionately-and
erroneously-lower estimates of child expenditures at this end of
the spectrum. It thus seems likely that this distortion in the CES
data accounts, at least in part, for PSI's conclusion that higher-
income households spend a much lower percentage of their in-
come on children than do lower-income households. 134
Some CES practices complicate the analysis of expenditure
reporting. The CES counts the full purchase price of big-ticket
items-cars, appliances, and the like-as expenditures in the
year of purchase, even if purchased on an installment contract.135
accounts, as well as investment in owner-occupied housing. The first two have already
been accounted for in the calculations in the text; the savings rate implied by the CES
data would be in excess of any pension contributions. See id at 193, Table 5-1.
132 Studies of recall surveys of expenditures in other countries suggest that underes-
timates of expenditures will be greater in larger households, because they will have more
transactions per time period, which tends to increase the risk of underreporting. John
Gibson, Why Does the Engel Method Work? Food Demand, Economies of Size and House-
hold Survey Methods, 64 Oxford Bulletin of Econ & Stats 341, 345 (2002) (describing
other studies). CES reports that consumer units with household incomes between $70,000
and $90,000 average 3.1 members, which is greater than the average number in all the
lower income households-often, much greater. BLS, CES Table 7050 at n 70 (cited in
note 125).
133 PSI determines consumption by making certain subtractions from total expendi-
tures. If the expenditure figures were proportionately higher, then the dollar amount of
the difference between childless couples and families with children would be greater, and
so thus would the dollar amount of the estimated child expenditures.
134 The tendency of guidelines to specify lower percentages of income at higher income
levels seems to be both widespread and longstanding. In the early 1990s Bassi and
Barnow reported that of thirty-three income shares states, in fourteen the percentage of
income paid for support steadily declines as the aggregate parental income increases,
while in sixteen the percentage first increases but then declines at high income levels. In
only three states did the percentage remains substantially constant over the full income
range. They concluded from this data that the guideline amounts have only a "loose"
relationship to empirical estimates of expenditures on children. Barnow and Bassi, 12 J
Pol Anal & Manage at 487-88 (cited in note 15).
135 See Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor, Report No 974, Con-
sumer Expenditures in 2002 1, 4 (2004), available online at
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This presents no problem when expenditures are averaged over
many families, but it does mean that one cannot also count the
full amount of installment payments on auto loans without dou-
ble-counting, since the payments include principal, as well as
interest. Therefore, the CES excludes the principal portion of
vehicle loans from the expenditure data. To do this, they just es-
timate the principal component of the loan payment reported to
them by the survey respondent. The remaining interest portion
is then reported in the CES data as "finance charges". 136 PSI ad-
justs the CES expenditure data by excluding the purchase price
of automobiles entirely; it does include the finance charges. 137
These adjustments exacerbate the underreporting problem. Cars
purchased for cash are omitted entirely from PSI's expenditure
data, and PSI therefore concedes that the effect of its method
"may underestimate total expenditures." 138 But even cars bought
on installment are underreported, since neither the purchase
price nor the principal portion of the installment payments are
included in PSI's consumption figures. In contrast to home mort-
gages, principal ordinarily forms by far the largest part of each
car loan payment (because cars are paid off over such a shorter
period), so this omission is not unimportant. 39 One might argue
that the true consumption cost of an automobile is the purchase
price less its resale value at the time it is sold or abandoned,
rather than the full purchase price. 140 But even if the full pur-
<httpJ/www.bls.gov/cexcsxann02.pdf> (visited July 9, 2004).
136 Unlike most entries in the CES, here the BLS does not rely on respondent self-
reports for the breakdown between principal and interest:
Here's my understanding of the vehicle expenditure data: In Section lB of the
Interview survey, data regarding the terms of the vehicle loan are collected.
These include the amount borrowed (principal only), the number of payments
contracted for, the length of the payment period (weekly, monthly, etc.), and
whether the payment includes things other than principal and interest, such as
insurance. From these data, the principal and interest portions of the loan are
calculated (rather than obtained directly) and included in the survey results.
Email from Geoffrey Paulin, Senior Economist, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Dec 10, 2003)
(on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
137 The author does not know whether PSI makes similar adjustments to major appli-
ance purchases.
138 Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at Appendix I (cited in note 9).
139 Id at Appendix 1, 6-7.
140 It appears that BLS reports the "net" price of a car as the purchase price less the
trade-in value that the dealer allows the purchaser for their existing car. However, if the
car buyer does not trade in the car, but sells it privately or disposes of it in any other way
(such as by gift to child), its value is not netted against the purchase price of the new car.
Apparently survey respondents are asked about such sales or transfers, but their re-
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chase price is not appropriately part of consumption, clearly a
large portion of it is. In any event, it seems that PSI's adjust-
ments further reduce the proportion of net income treated as
consumption, thus reducing further its estimate of marginal
child expenditures. For the lowest of its fourteen income groups,
PSI estimates household consumption as 265 percent of net in-
come, but for the highest income group it is only 58 percent. In-
deed, consumption, as calculated by PSI, is 75 percent or less of
household net income for families with net household incomes of
$60,640 per year or more.' 4 '
Another gap in the CES expenditure data has particular
relevance to PSI's choice of the Rothbarth equivalence scale,
which determines child expenditures by equating families with
similar expenditures on adult clothing. While the CES reports
expenditures on adult clothing separately from expenditures on
children's clothing, for this purpose it puts clothing purchases for
seventeen and eighteen year olds in the adult grouping.142 The
uncorrected CES data thus inflates the expenditures on adult
clothing for families with older teenagers, and would lead the
Rothbarth scale to equate the living standard of childless couples
to families with children that have lower incomes than one would
find if the clothing reports were accurate. Betson is aware of this
problem and attempts to correct for it. Using publicly available
CES microdata, he reduces reported "adult clothing" expendi-
tures in families with seventeen and eighteen year olds by the
sponses are not used to adjust the cost of the new car. Email from Geoffrey Paulin, Senior
Economist, Bureau of Labor Statistics (Dec 14 and 15, 2003) (on file with the University
of Chicago Legal Forum).
141 Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at Appendix I, 4 (cited in note 9). PSI also
follows the CES in excluding as an expenditure the principal portion of home mortgage
payments. See id at App I, 6-7. For most purposes, principal payments can reasonably be
regarded as a form of savings rather than consumption, but their exclusion from the
expenditure data is probably inappropriate for the purpose of child support guidelines.
The purpose of the child support system is to require the noncustodial parent to contrib-
ute a fair proportion of the custodial household's expenses. Those periodic expenses in-
clude the full amount of mortgage payments. If we were to ask: how much more do par-
ents pay monthly on housing on account of their children?, we would answer with the full
difference in the mortgage payment incurred to buy the bigger house, or the house in the
better school district. The principal portion of mortgage payments is typically small in the
early years of any loan, so this factor seems unlikely to contribute significantly to lower
guideline figures, but it does illustrate the problem with relying on ordinary economic
conventions rather than on child support policy choices in making fundamental decisions
about support guidelines.
142 Bureau of the Census, US Department of Commerce, Form CE-801, Record of Your
Daily Expenses 1, 7 (2004), available online at <http://www.bls.gov/cex/csx801p.pdf> (vis-
ited July 9, 2004) (where the Bureau of the Census is acting as collecting agent for United
States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics).
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clothing expenditure he attributes to these older teenagers. The
attribution is simply per capita, so that, for example, adult cloth-
ing expenditures are reduced by one-third for families consisting
of two parents and a seventeen-year-old child.143 It is difficult to
know whether this per capital attribution is correct; one can
imagine reasons why it might be too low or too high. Yet because
total dollar amounts of clothing expenditures are very small,
relative to total consumption-approximately 2 percent, depend-
ing upon the composition and income of the household-
estimating errors of just a few hundred dollars could have a very
large impact on the Rothbarth analysis.44
143 See Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at Appendix I, 4 (cited in note 9). PSrs
explanation of the adjustment is unintelligible, but implies that clothing expenditures for
twelve year olds is used to estimate the expenditures on older teenagers. The author
wrote Professor Betson to obtain clarification, since PSI here relies on his calculations.
Professor Betson replied:
In an attempt to correct for this problem, in families where there were children
[aged] 16 to 18, I proportionately allocated (on a per capita basis) adult clothing
to the adults (parents) and the children (aged 16 to 18). But remember in the
Rothbarth estimating scheme, the amount spent on the children is not what [is]
being used but the amount being spent on adults. By examining how parents
reduce the expenditures upon themselves due to the presence of children we can
estimate how they spend on the children. But this "correction" still did not fully
rectify the problems in estimating the costs of children aged 16 to 18 (the re-
sults indicated that didn't cost any thing) and provide an estimate over the full
18 years[.] I attributed the costs of 13 to 15 years olds to the older children on
the assumption the problems that I was having estimating the 16 to 18 year
olds was attributed to this allocation problem. I guess I have not read the por-
tion of the PSI report you have noted in your message. Hopefully this answers
your questions.
Email from Professor David Betson (Dec 2, 2003). The author initially understood this
email to mean that Betson assumed that expenditures on clothes for children aged thir-
teen to fifteen, available in BLS microdata, was on average equal, per capita, to that for
children sixteen to eighteen, and thus adjusted adult clothing expenditures for families
with older teenagers by subtracting these inferred expenditures on them from the re-
ported amount for adult clothing. The author replied to Professor Betson on December 4
seeking confirmation of this understanding, but received no reply. Later, Jane Venohr of
PSI offered her view that Professor Betson in fact made the adjustment with the method
described in the text. Telephone conversation with Jane Venohr (Dec 23, 2003). The au-
thor has had no response to an email to Professor Betson on December 29, 2003, asking
for confirmation of this revised understanding, but has relied upon Dr. Venohr's explana-
tion.
144 For example, households with household incomes between $60,000 and $70,000
report expenditures on apparel and "apparel services" (dry cleaning and like) that aver-
ages, in total, $1,300 for household members sixteen years or older. Total apparel expen-
ditures, including children, is $2,395. The amount spent on adults-those younger than
eighteen-is presumably between these numbers. See BLS, CES Table 7050 (cited in note
125).
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D. Conclusion
PSI uses the CES data because it believes it has no better al-
ternative source. I certainly have none to suggest. There are
other sources of income data and expenditure data, but for the
construction of support guidelines using PSI's methodology, one
requires a dataset that connects them. While the CES data may
be the best available, it has problems that pose a particular chal-
lenge for its use in the construction of child support guidelines.
Both income and expenditures are underreported, but it appears
that income is disproportionately underreported in the low-
income groups, while expenditures are disproportionately under-
reported in the high-income groups, so that guideline recommen-
dations are distorted at both ends of the scale, but in opposite
directions. Clothing expenditures are systematically underre-
ported, a particular problem when relying on the Rothbarth es-
timator, and clothing expenditures for seventeen and eighteen
year olds are aggregated with adult clothing expenditures, a po-
tentially significant source of distortion given the small dollar
amounts involved. PSI attempts to deal with some of these prob-
lems, but even when it does, it is not clear that its adjustments
always help. The fluctuation over time in child expenditure esti-
mates is one possible sign of data problems. Whether one uses
the Engel or Rothbarth scale, Betson's estimates of parents' ex-
penditures on their children, as a percent of total family expendi-
tures, have declined in recent years. 145 It seems implausible that
parental practices have changed very much over the two decades
for which such estimates have been made. It is possible that
there is a fluctuation in the cost of child-related expenses relative
to other expenses, but it is certainly not obvious that this is so. It
would be useful to determine the source of these declining esti-
mates in the data, but such an effort is beyond this Article's
scope.
145 See Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at 11 (cited in note 9). The PSI Arizona
report shows these estimates of average childrearing expenditures as a percent of total
family expenditures:
Estimate and Data Source Number of Children:
One Two Three
Betson-Engel (1980-86 data) 33% 49% 59%
Betson-Engel (1996-99 data) 30% 44% 52%
Betson-Rothbarth (1980-86 data) 25% 37% 44%
Betson-Rothbarth (1996-99 data) 25% 35% 41%
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Defects in the CES data are a problem not only for those who
use the PSI methodology for construction of support guidelines.
Those who wish to adopt an equal living standard approach or an
ALI approach confront similar problems, because the data de-
fects undermine one's ability to use any of the conventional
methods for deciding the incomes at which families of different
compositions enjoy equivalent living standards.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Any revision of child support guidelines presents the poten-
tial for a contest between feminist and father's rights groups.
With this potential for gender wars always lurking, there is an
obvious appeal to resolving at least the fundamental question-
the numbers put in the guideline grid-by reliance on a seem-
ingly neutral principle (continuity-of-expenditure) and upon neu-
tral technical experts who implement that principle through the
application of a value-free methodology. The message of this Ar-
ticle is that the apparent availability of this choice is an illusion.
It is an illusion because the proffered principle, more accurately
labeled continuity-of-marginal-expenditure: (1) is not neutral, (2)
is not coherent (because it does not reflect any consistent vision
of child support policy), and (3) the method employed for imple-
menting this flawed principle-the equivalence scale-is empiri-
cally unverifiable, theoretically questionable, and made opera-
tional by reliance upon flawed data, the defects of which are
typically hidden from policymakers by an impenetrable barrier of
technical jargon.
Those responsible for drafting child support guidelines must
confront the fact that their task has no value-neutral, objective
"answer." Any set of child support guidelines necessarily ex-
presses a view about the appropriate tradeoffs in the legitimate
interests of the affected parties. In the usual case, there is no
child support order that can satisfy the maximum reasonable
claims that can be made on behalf of the obligor, the obligee, and
the child. The question, therefore, is necessarily how to balance
the shortfall in expectation that each of these parties is likely to
experience, in a way that is fair and which implements appropri-
ate public policy.
A child support committee must confront this basic question
in a systematic and informed manner. The consultant should be
a tool available to the public body entrusted with preparing the
guidelines, not the formulator, overtly or by default, of the basic
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policy decisions. At the same time, the preparation of support
guidelines must be undertaken with appreciation of its inevitably
inexact nature. Not only conceptual challenges, but also limita-
tions in the available data, ensure that truly accurate estimates
of parental expenditures on children, much less precise compari-
sons of the living standards of the two post-divorce households,
are simply not possible. This does not necessarily mean that re-
formed or improved versions of existing estimation practices are
worthless, but it does mean they must be employed with great
caution, with an understanding of their inadequacies, with sensi-
tivity to their underlying assumptions, and only as one tool in a
larger arsenal, not as an "objective truth" that compels particular
numbers in a child support grid. Most certainly, any use of these
methods must be informed by policy judgments about which
kinds of errors are most important to avoid and which kinds can
be better tolerated, as well as by common sense.
There is also a need to bring additional kinds of data to bear
upon the guideline writing process. The limitation of the CES is
not only that the data has flaws that can distort estimates of pa-
rental expenditures on children based upon it, but also that it
cannot tell us anything else. The two primary policy imperatives
that any set of support guidelines ought to further are child wel-
fare and fairness in the allocation of the support burden between
the child's parents. What is needed is more data that bears di-
rectly on these two concerns. First, we need to know more about
the extent to which child welfare depends upon support pay-
ments. The literature on that subject is relatively sparse. It has
not been surveyed in this Article, and the existing literature may
not be fully adequate to this task.146 But what is available ought
to be consulted, and if there are gaps in that literature, research-
ers should be encouraged to fill them. Everyone intuits that a
child's welfare is importantly compromised by poverty; most as-
sume that it is advanced by affluence. But the precise contours of
the function relating money to child welfare cannot be intuited.
It seems likely, however, that the relationship is neither linear
nor infinite. Certainly, if the curve becomes less steep at higher
income levels, and flattens entirely at some point, that is an im-
portant fact that needs to be taken into account by whatever
public agency is responsible for writing support guidelines.
146 For a glimpse of this literature, see the sources cited in note 16.
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Second, we need to think more about fairness as between the
parents. As noted in the beginning of this Article, that concern
can cut in both directions, depending upon the nature of the case.
It is obvious that fairness to the obligor parent places some limit
on the size of the support order we might otherwise impose upon
him in order to vindicate child welfare concerns. But it is also
true that fairness to the custodial parent might justify support
payments even when they are not essential to child welfare (as
where the custodial household can provide a reasonable envi-
ronment to the child unassisted). In the latter case, we still re-
quire payment from the other parent, not because it is necessary
for child welfare, but because it is unfair to impose the entire
cost of providing for the child on the custodial parent. But there
may be some cases in which such fairness concerns cannot en-
tirely fill the justification gap left by the missing child welfare
rationale. A case in point may be that of the custodial parent who
remarries, and whose new spouse has considerably more income
than the support obligor. Support obligors often feel keenly that
it is unfair for the law to ignore this newfound prosperity of the
custodial household in fixing parental obligations, as the law
usually does. Cases in which the custodial parent's income is
considerably greater than the support obligor's provide another
example in which the norms expressed by the typical guidelines
may be inconsistent with the beliefs of the parties themselves,
who often agree in such cases to forego all but nominal or sym-
bolic support payments. While fairness is usually regarded as a
philosophical inquiry, the views of parents about the fair result
in such cases cannot be ignored by the policymaker, and child
support guideline writers would benefit from more systematic
knowledge of the principles people intuitively employ in making
these fairness judgments. That data should not be limited to spe-
cific questions such as the impact of the custodial parent's re-
marriage. Psychological data, as much as economic data, may
help to compare the relative living standards of different house-
holds. There is some data now on these kinds of issues, but more
is needed.
To the extent the preceding paragraphs suggest research,
they are not helpful to a public body charged with preparing
guidelines today. But there are lessons here with immediate
relevance. In particular, the following specific recommendations
for any guideline-writing committee seem to follow from what we
have learned in this inquiry:
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(1) The committee must start by making sure all of its
members understand the nature of the inquiry and the
limitations of available knowledge. In particular, it is im-
portant that everyone understands the following:
(A) The economic reports traditionally provided to
guideline committees do not purport to provide esti-
mates of the cost of raising children, and child support
guidelines have not been based on cost estimates.
(B) The traditional economic reports do provide some
information on what parents in intact families spend
on their children, and about the relative economic wel-
fare of the custodial and noncustodial households, but
their estimates are necessarily imprecise, and de-
pendent upon decisions, ultimately untestable, about
how to allocate expenditures among household mem-
bers, which equivalence scale to use, and upon in-
formed guesses (at best) about how to compensate for
unavoidable limitations in the available data.
(C) Child support guidelines necessarily and properly
express a view about how to balance the legitimate
claims of each of the parents and of the children, that
in most cases all three parties must settle for a result
that falls short of fully satisfying their legitimate
claims, and that the committee's task is to decide
upon guidelines that compromise the claims of all par-
ties in a manner that is fair to all of them, and that
takes account of relevant public policies, including,
most importantly (but not exclusively), the state's in-
terest in protecting the welfare of minor children.
(D) While there is no theoretical justification for bas-
ing support guidelines on marginal expenditures on
children in intact households, as opposed to any other
allocation of a household's joint expenditures, com-
parisons of the relative economic well-being of the cus-
todial and noncustodial household, if possible, would
assist the committee in making judgments about the
fairness of any proposed guidelines.
(2) In carrying out its task, the committee should require
the consultant to provide its best analysis of the relative
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economic welfare in the custodial and noncustodial
households that will result from any particular set of
guidelines under consideration, across a wide range of pa-
rental incomes and household sizes. The consultant's
analysis should also provide the committee with a sense
of the range within which plausible estimates of the rela-
tive household living standard may vary. An appropriate
and effective way to do this would employ the familiar
statistical tool of a sensitivity analysis, which shows how
sensitive the estimates are to plausible changes in the as-
sumptions upon which they are based, and by displaying
not merely a mean estimate, but the full range of esti-
mates that would result from the full range of plausible
underlying assumptions. While the committee requires
estimates of relative living standards to evaluate pro-
posed guidelines, it also needs to know the plausible
range of estimates so that it may give appropriate weight
to this factor in light of its judgment about the relative
harms of setting guidelines too low or too high. Commit-
tee members should be aware of the theoretical fragility of
the various equivalence scales employed to make such
comparisons, as well as the pragmatic accommodations
traditionally made by economic analysts called upon to
make them.
(3) In carrying out the household comparisons required
under Recommendation 2, and in preparing the guideline
grid that relates the support obligation to parental in-
come, the committee should seek, with the consultant's
help, alternative methods for assessing the relative eco-
nomic welfare of the parties before and after the child
support payment required by any proposed guideline. One
possibility that may be worth exploring would start by de-
termining the household income that families of varying
size require, in light of the local cost of living, to maintain
living standards equal to each of several standard bench-
marks (for example, lower middle class, upper middle
class). Proposed sets of child support guidelines could
then be assessed by comparing the incomes of the custo-
dial and noncustodial households, after application of the
guidelines, to these cost-of-living benchmarks, in order to
assess the fairness and adequacy of the child support or-
der that proposed guidelines would yield in a variety of
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situations.147 Especially in the context of setting child
support guidelines, expert assessments of the money re-
quired by a family of any particular size to achieve vari-
ous alternative living standards may have certain advan-
tages over the equivalence-scale methodology currently in
use. In particular, this cost-of-living approach describes
and classifies a family's economic welfare in a way that
lay members of child support guideline committees are
more likely to be able to understand and evaluate. The
cost-of-living method also avoids the pretense of precision
that is so misleading in the equivalence-scale method cur-
rently used. The cost-of-living method not only makes
clear that judgment calls are required, but necessarily re-
veals those judgment calls in ways that committee mem-
bers could react to intelligently. The equivalence-scale
method, by contrast, while no more accurate or objective
than the cost-of-living method, effectively forestalls such
147 This suggestion may remind some of the Household Budgets that were once pre-
pared annually by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. In 1978 the BLS commissioned an
expert panel to consider revising its method for preparing these budgets, and the panel in
fact suggested significant changes in methodology. Harold Watts, Special Panel Suggests
Changes in BLS Family Budget Program, 103 Monthly Labor Rev No 12 3, 3-10 (1980).
Ultimately the BLS abandoned the calculation of these budgets as a result of funding
pressures, and the expert committee's suggestions were therefore never implemented.
David Johnson, John Rogers and Lucilla Tan, A Century of Family Budgets in the United
States, 124 Monthly Labor Rev No 5 28, 33 (2001). However, the method suggested by the
expert panel is not difficult to implement because its "Prevailing Family Standard" is
based on the median spending patterns of the base family (a two-parent family with two
children). See Watts, 103 Monthly Labor Rev at 4. The prior methodology, in contrast,
required and was based upon expert assessments of the basket of goods that need be
purchased by a middle-class family, and the cost of those goods. The panel's approach is
called a "descriptive" standard as contrasted with the previously used "prescriptive" ap-
proach, and Johnson, Rogers and Tan have calculated its value for several years. John-
son, Rogers, and Tan, 124 Monthly Labor Rev at 29, 36. One advantage of the expert
panel's approach is the relative ease of calculating Prevailing Family Standards sepa-
rately for separate localities. The suggestion in the text could be implemented by also
calculating similar benchmarks at percentile points above and below the median. (The
expert panel's calculated higher and lower standards were simply multiples of the "pre-
vailing" standard.) Nonetheless, this method also requires a way to compare relative
living standards between households of different size: there is obviously no reason, for
example, to assume that the median two-parent family of four has the same living stan-
dard as the median single-parent family of three. On this point, the expert panel had
little to offer. While it endorsed a particular method for calculating such equivalencies, it
conceded that it had little confidence in it, endorsing it only because it saw no particular
basis to pick any alternative. See the discussion in Johnson, Rogers, and Tan, 124
Monthly Labor Rev at 38. The problem of devising a non-arbitrary equivalence scale thus
appears here as well. Note, however, that this equivalence scale problem is avoided if one
returned to BLS's original prescriptive methodology. This is essentially the suggestion set
out in the text. At least for the purpose of generating child support guidelines, then,
reconsideration of the original BLS methodology would appear worthwhile.
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intelligent committee debate by combining a pretense of
neutral and objective expertise with an inherent complex-
ity that defies easy comprehension.
(4) To the extent that reliance upon traditional expendi-
ture analysis is employed, the committee should instruct
the consultant with respect to important methodological
choices. For example:
(A) Exclusive reliance upon the Rothbarth equivalence
scale seems problematic. One possibility is to use a
midpoint between the estimates returned by Engel
and Rothbarth. This method is consistent with the
conclusion of the most recent task force commissioned
by the Department of Health and Human Services on
estimating child expenditures in the construction of
child support guidelines, which concluded that "the
Engel estimates are likely to be an upper bound of the
true expenditures on children, while the Rothbarth es-
timates are likely to be a lower bound."148 Use of a
midpoint, rather than exclusive reliance upon the
Rothbarth method, also reduces the questionable reli-
ance upon the adult clothing expenditure data that
may undermine any implementation of the Rothbarth
scale. A different alternative is to make use of the ex-
penditure estimates prepared by the Department of
Agriculture.
(B) In converting between expenditures and income,
the consultant must take better account of apparent
defects in the CES data, in particular, the likelihood
that income is disproportionately underreported in the
lower income groups, and expenditures disproportion-
ately underreported in the upper income groups. The
child support analysis should start from the assump-
tion that expenditures on children are a constant per-
centage of net income across an income range likely to
148 LewinIICF, Estimates of Expenditures at 2-31 (cited in note 8). As explained in the
study's acknowledgments page, it was prepared by Burt Barnow and included Laurie
Bassi, Laudan Aron, and Abhay Pande among its authors. Monitors in HHS were in-
volved in close review of this report throughout, and the Department established a highly
qualified outside technical review panel to ensure that it accurately represented then-
current research. It clearly seems the best comprehensive study of its kind.
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include the great majority of families whose incomes
are actually represented on the grid, except to the ex-
tent the evidence shows an increasing savings rate
across this income range. This assumption is consis-
tent with the repeated finding that expenditures on
children are a constant percentage of total expendi-
tures across a wide income range. In the absence of
persuasive reasons to the contrary, it seems difficult
to justify a regressive child support schedule that im-
poses higher percentage obligation on lower-income
obligors. Current economic reports do not meet this
burden of persuasion because it is not sufficiently
clear that the data on which they rely for justifying a
regressive support schedule reflects actual behavior
by parents, rather than artifacts produced by defects
in the survey data.149
(C) The consultant should examine available data on
the relationship between household income and child
welfare, to determine whether that data reveals any
relationship between household income and child wel-
fare. Such data, if available, can shed light on a vari-
ety of issues. These include: a) whether support guide-
lines should take into account the entire household in-
come of the custodial parent, including the income of a
new spouse, and b) the income level above which child
welfare concerns do not justify proportional increases
in support levels.
(D) The committee should consider the consultant's
practice with respect to excluding certain expendi-
tures from the accounting of household consumption.
As a general matter the consultant should provide the
committee with an inventory of all expenditures it
proposes to exclude, in a manner that facilitates the
committee's review of the appropriate policy with re-
spect to these exclusions. Three categories of expendi-
tures currently excluded in common consultant prac-
tice are noted in particular. First, the full cost of
149 For an early argument for this position, see Irwin Garfinkel and Margo Melli, The
Use of Normative Standards in Family Law Decisions: Developing Mathematical Stan-
dards for Child Support, 24 Fain L Q 157, 168-70 (1990).
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automobile purchases, and not just finance charges on
automobile loans, should be counted. Second, the
committee should consider whether it is appropriate
to exclude the principal portion of home mortgage
payments, given that the carrying charges required to
live in the home include them. Finally, the current
practice of excluding expenditures on life insurance is
questionable: given that its primary purpose is to pro-
tect dependent family members from, the financial
consequences of a parent's premature death, most of
the cost of life insurance is reasonably regarded as an
expenditure on children.
(E) In comparing the economic circumstances of the
custodial and noncustodial households, attention must
be given to the tax circumstances of each, and to child-
related expenditures ordinarily incurred by noncusto-
dial parents who exercise routine visitation. There is
some evidence that the failure to consider these fac-
tors has sometimes distorted such comparisons. 150
(5) States employing income shares rather than POOI
guidelines face a methodological problem if they use gross
rather than net income guidelines. One must of course as-
sume a tax rate in converting the net income figures upon
which the support calculations are necessarily based, to
the gross income figures contained in the guidelines. In a
POOI state, in which the guidelines are based on the in-
come of the obligor alone, rough estimates of the obligor's
tax liability are relatively straightforward. In an income
shares state, in which the guidelines are based upon the
aggregate income of both parents, the result of any con-
version depends upon the assumption one makes about
the two parents' relative contributions to their aggregate
income. The highest inferred tax liability arises if one as-
sumes that all the income is earned by one parent. This is
the assumption adopted by PSI for its Arizona recommen-
dations, in implementing Arizona's decision to employ
gross income guidelines. To the extent both parents earn
income, the resulting grid yields a child support obligation
that is lower than it should be (because it is assuming a
150 See Braver and Stockberger, Child support guidelines (cited in note 36).
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higher tax rate, and thus a lower net income, than is in
fact the case). PSI flags this problem in its report. 5 1
Many income-shares states use net income. 5 2 This is cer-
tainly the more accurate approach. Net income guidelines
can be implemented by applying a presumptive tax rate to
the gross income of each parent, based on that parent's
income and current family status, reserving for each par-
ent the possibility of overcoming the presumption with
evidence of a parent's special tax circumstances. Guide-
lines constructed in this manner would not be more diffi-
cult to apply, in most cases, than guidelines based upon
gross income, and seem a better approach than gross in-
come guidelines.
The construction of child support guidelines is a difficult
task. Expert consultants can assist in that task, but they cannot
perform it, because there is no technical expertise that resolves
the conflicting, legitimate claims of the parties affected by any
set of support guidelines. Resolution of that conflict is a policy
judgment. In making that policy judgment, those charged with
the responsibility for writing child support guidelines can make
use of expert assistance, but they must also understand the lim-
its that available data and methods place on the usefulness of
the expert advice available to them.
151 See Venohr and Griffith, Economic Basis at Appendix I, 11-12 (cited in note 9).
152 For a compilation, see id at 11.
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